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Abstract: Norway has used e-voting in its last political election in September 2011, with more
than 25 000 voters using the e-voting option. The underlying protocol is a new protocol designed by
the ERGO group, involving several actors (a bulletin box but also a receipt generator, a decryption
service, and an auditor). Of course, trusting the correctness and security of e-voting protocols is
crucial in that context. Formal definitions of properties such as privacy, coercion-resistance or
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Analyse formelle du protocole de vote
électronique Norvégien
Résumé : En Septembre 2011, la Norvège a mis en place le vote élec-
tronique lors de ses élections politiques, avec plus de 25 000 votants qui ont
effectivement utilisé cette option. Le protocole sous-jacent, créé par la com-
pagnie ERGOgroup, met en jeu plusieurs acteurs (une urne mais également un
générateur de reçu, un déchiffreur et un auditeur). Pouvoir faire confiance en
l’exactitude et la sécurité des protocoles de votes électroniques est bien entendu
crucial dans ce contexte. En se basant sur des propriétés d’équivalence, des
définitions formelles de la confidentialité, de la résistance à la coercition ou de
la vérifiabilité on été récemment proposées.
Dans ce rapport, nous proposons une analyse formelle du protocole utilisé en
Norvège dans le but de démontrer la propriété de confidentialité en considérant
plusieurs scénarios de corruption. Une partie de cette étude a été menée avec
l’utilisation de l’outil ProVerif, sur un modèle simplifié.
Mots-clés : confidentialité, méthodes formelles, vote électronique
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1 Introduction
Electronic voting protocols promise a convenient, efficient and reliable way for
collecting and tallying the votes, avoiding for example usual human errors when
counting. It is used or have been used for political elections in several countries
like e.g. USA, Estonia, Swiss and recently Norway, at least in trials. However,
the recent history has shown that these systems are highly vulnerable to attacks.
For example, the Diebold machines as well as the electronic machines used in
India have been attacked [12, 20]. Consequently, the use of electronic voting
raises many ethical and political issues. For example, the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court decided on 3 March 2009 that electronic voting used for the
last 10 years was unconstitutional [1].
There is therefore a pressing need for a rigorous analysis of the security of e-
voting protocols. A first step towards the security analysis of e-voting protocols
consists in precisely defining security w.r.t. e-voting. Ryan et al. have proposed
formal definitions for several key properties such as privacy, receipt-freeness,
coercion resistance, or verifiability [11, 16] in terms of equivalence-based prop-
erties. It is however difficult to formally analyse e-voting protocols for two main
reasons. First there are very few tools that can check equivalence properties:
ProVerif [6, 7] is probably the only one but it does not really work in the context
of e-voting (because it tries to show a stronger notion of equivalence, which is not
fulfilled when checking for ballot secrecy). Moreover, the cryptographic prim-
itives used in e-voting are rather complex and non standard and are typically
not supported by existing tools.
In this paper, we study the protocol used in last September for political
elections in Norway [2]. E-voting was proposed as trials in several municipalities
and more than 25 000 voters did use e-voting to actually cast their vote. The
protocol is publicly available [14] and can be seen as a variant of the Helios
protocol [4] with additional components: a Receipt Generator and an Auditor
which aim at watching the Bulletin Box recording the votes. The resulting
protocol is therefore complex, e.g. using El Gamal encryption in a non standard
way. In [14], Gjøsteen describes the protocol and discusses its security. To our
knowledge, there does not exist any security proof, even for the crucial property
of vote privacy.
Our contribution. We conduct a formal analysis of the Norwegian protocol
w.r.t. privacy. Our first contribution is the proposition of a formal model of
the protocol in applied-pi calculus [3]. One particularity of the protocol is to
distribute public keys pk(a1), pk(a2), and pk(a3) for the three authorities, such
that the corresponding private keys a1, a2, and a3 verify the relation a1 + a2 =
a3, allowing one component (here the Bulletin Box) to re-encrypt messages.
The protocol also makes use of signature, of zero-knowledge proofs, of blinding
functions and coding functions. We have therefore proposed a new equational
theory reflecting the unusual behavior of the primitives.
Our second contribution is a formal security proof of privacy, in the presence
of arbitrarily many dishonest voters. Given the complexity of the equational
theory (with e.g. four associative and commutative symbols), the resulting
processes can clearly not be analyzed with existing tools, even ProVerif. We
therefore proved privacy (expressed as an equivalence property) by hand. The
proof happens to be quite technical. Its first step is rather standard and consists
in guessing a relation such that the two initial processes and all their possible
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evolutions are in relation. The second step is more involved: it requires to prove
equivalent an infinite number of frames, the frames representing all possible
attacker knowledge. Indeed, unlike most previously analyzed protocols, the
Norwegian protocol emits receipts for the voters, potentially providing extra
information to the attacker. Proving static equivalence is also made difficult
due to our equational theory (e.g. four associative and commutative symbols).
Our third contribution is an analysis of the protocol for further corruption
scenarios, using the ProVerif tool in a simplified model (therefore possibly losing
attacks). In conclusion, we did not find any attack, except when the bulletin
box and the receipt generator or the decryption service alone are corrupted.
These attacks are probably not surprising but they were never made explicit in
the documentation we found.
Related Work. [14] provides a discussion on the security of the Norwegian
protocol but no security proof. We do not know any other study related to
this protocol. Several other e-voting protocols have been studying using formal
methods. The FOO [13], Okamoto [19] and Lee et al. [17] voting protocols have
been analysed in [11]. Similarly, Helios has been recently proved secure both
in a formal [10] and a computational [5] model. However, all these protocols
were significantly simpler to analyse. Indeed, the voters (and thus the dishonest
voters) had very few interactions with the other components, sending only their
ballots. In contrast, in the Norwegian protocol, both the Receipt Generator and
the Bulletin Box send receipts to the voters, that depend in the casted ballot.
Therefore, the knowledge of the attacker increases at each step.
We informally describe the protocol in Section 2. The applied-pi calculus is
briefly defined in Section 3. We then provide a formal modeling of the protocol
in Section 4 and formally state and prove the privacy properties satisfied by
the protocol in Section 5. The results obtained with ProVerif are described in
Section 6. Concluding remarks can be found in Section 7. All the proofs are
provided in Appendix.
2 Norwegian E-Voting Protocol
V P B
R
D
A
Norwegian protocol features several players including four players represent-
ing the electronic poll’s infrastructure : a ballot box (B), a receipt generator
(R), a decryption service (D) and an auditor (A). Each voter (V) can log in
using a computer (P) in order to submit his vote. Channels between computers
(voters) and the ballot box are considered as authenticated channel, channels
between infrastructure’s player are untappable channels and channel between
voters and receipt generator is a unidirectional out-of-band channel. (Example
of SMS is given in [14].) The protocol can be divided in three phases : the
Inria
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V P B R
x← gr ,
w← y1
r f (v) ,
p← pfk ,
si← sign((x ,w , p) ,id v )
v
x̌← x sV ,
w̌←w sV x̌a2 ,
p̌← pfk '
b=(x ,w , p , si)
ř
b '=(b , x̌ , w̌ , p̌)
ř←dV (w̌ x̌
−a3) ,
h←hash((vk (idV ) , b)) ,
siR← sign(h ,id R)
siR
Ok
(o ,dV ( f (o)
sV))
o∈O
a2 , vk ( idV ) ,
(v , sV ) ,V∈EV
g , idV ,
y1=g
a2
a3 , idR , vk ( idV )
(v ,dV ) ,V∈EV
Figure 1: Submission of one vote.
setting phase, the submission phase, where voters submit their votes, and the
counting phase, where ballots are counted and auditor verifies the correctness
of the election.
2.1 Setting phase
Before the election, private keys a1, a2, and a3 (such that a1 + a2 = a3) are
distributed over, respectively D, B, and R, while the corresponding public keys
are made publicly available. The receipt generator R is assumed to have a
signing key idR which corresponding verification key is distributed to P. The
voters are also assume to each have a signing key idV which corresponding
verification key is distributed to B. The bulletin board B is provided with a
table V 7→ sV with a blinding factor sV for each voter V . The receipt generator
R is given a table V 7→ dV with a permutation function dV for each voter V .
Finally, each voter V is assumed to received by post a table where, for each
voting option o corresponds a precomputed receipt code dV (f(o)sV ).
2.2 Submission phase
The submission phase is depicted in Figure 1. We detail below the expected
behavior of each participant.
Voter (V). Each voter tells his computer what voting option o to submit and
allows it to sign the corresponding ballot on his behalf. Then, he has to wait for
an acceptance message coming from the computer and a receipt rˇ sent by the
receipt generator through the out-of-band channel. Using the receipt, he verifies
that the correct vote was submitted, that is, he checks that rˇ = dV (f(o)sV ) by
verifying that the receipt code rˇ indeed appears in the line associated to o.
Computer (P). Voter’s computer encrypts voter’s ballot using the public
key y1 using standard El Gamal encryption. The resulting ballot is (gr, yrf(o))
RR n° 7781
6 Cortier & Wiedling
where f is some encoding function for voting options. P also proves that the
created ciphertext correspond to the correct vote, by computing a standard
signature proof of knowledge pfk . How pfk is computed exactly can be found
in [14]. P also signs the ballot with idV and sends it to the ballot box. It then
waits for a confirmation siR coming from the latter, which is a hash of the initial
encrypted ballot, signed by the receipt generator. After checking this signature,
the computer notifies the voter that his vote has been taken into account.
Bulletin Box (B). Receiving an encrypted and signed ballot b from a com-
puter, the ballot box checks first the correctness of signatures and proofs before
re-encrypting with a2 and blinding with sV the original encrypted ballot, also
generating a proof pfk ′, showing that its computation is correct. B then sends
the new modified ballot b′ to the receipt generator. Once the ballot box receives
a message siR from the receipt generator, it simply checks that the receipt gen-
erator’s signature is valid, and sends it to the computer.
Receipt generator (R). When receiving an encrypted ballot b′ = (b, xˇ, wˇ, pˇ)
from the ballot box, the receipt generator first checks signature and proofs (from
the computer and the ballot box). If the checks are successful, it generates:
• a receipt code rˇ = dV (wˇxˇa3) sent by out-of-band channel directly to the
voter. Intuitively, the receipt generator decrypts the (blinded) ballot,
applying the permutation function dV associated to the voter. This gives
assurance to the voter that the correct vote was submitted to the bulletin
board.
• a signature on a hash of the original encrypted ballot for the ballot box.
Once transmitted by the bulletin board, it allows the computer to inform
the voter that his vote has been accepted.
2.3 Counting phase
Once the ballot box is closed, the counting phase begins (Figure 2). The bal-
lot box selects the encrypted votes x1, . . . , xk which need to be decrypted (if
a voter is re-voting, all the submitted ballots are in the memory of the ballot
box and only the last ballot should be sent) and sends them to the decryption
service. The whole content of the ballot box b1, . . . , bn (n ≥ k) is revealed
to the auditor, including previous votes from re-voting voters. The receipt
generator sends to the auditor the list of hashes of ballots it has seen during
the submission phase. The decryption service decrypts the incoming cipher-
texts x1, . . . , xk received from the ballot box and mix the results before out-
putting them dec(xσ(1), a1), . . . , dec(xσ(k), a1) where σ denotes the permutation
obtained by shuﬄing the votes. It also provides the auditor with a proof pfk
showing that the input ciphertexts and the outcoming decryption indeed match.
Using the ballot box content and the list of hashes from the receipt generator,
the auditor verifies that no ballots have been inserted or lost and computes his
own list of encrypted ballots which should be counted. He compares this list
with the one received from the decryption service and verifies the proof given
by the latter.
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A R B D
(h1 ,… , hn)
(x1 ,…, xk )
(b1,…, bn)
(( x1 ,…xk ) ,(dec (x σ (1 ) , a1),…, dec (xσ (k) , a1)), proof )
Figure 2: Counting phase.
3 Applied Pi Calculus
We use the framework of the applied-pi calculus [3] for formally describing the
Norwegian protocol. To help with readability, the definitions of the applied-pi
calculus are briefly recalled here.
3.1 Terms
As usual, messages are represented by terms build upon an infinite set of names
N (used to name communication channels or atomic data), a set of variables
X and a signature Σ consisting of a finite set of function symbols which will
be used to represent cryptographic primitives. A function symbol f is assumed
to be given with its arity ar(f). Then the set of terms T (Σ,X ,N ) is formally
defined by the grammar
t, t1, t2, . . . ::=
x x ∈ X
n n ∈ N
f(t1, . . . , tn) f ∈ Σ, n = ar(f)
We write {M1/x1 , . . . ,Mn /xn} for the substitution that replaces the variables xi
with the termsMi. Nσ refers to the result of applying substitution σ to the free
variables of term N . A term is called ground when it does not contain variables.
In order to represent the properties of the primitives, the signature Σ is
equipped with an equational theory E that is a set of equations which hold on
terms built from the signature. We denote =E the smallest equivalence relation
induced by E, closed under application of function symbols, substitution of
terms for variables and bijective renaming of names. We write M =E N when
the equation M = N is in the theory E.
Example 3.1. A standard signature for representing encryption is Σ = {dec, penc}
where penc represents encryption while dec is decryption. Then the property of
decryption is modeled by the theory Eenc, defined by the equation
dec(penc(x, r, pk(k)), k) = x.
RR n° 7781
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P,Q,R ::= (plain) processes
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
ν n.P name restriction
if φ then P else Q conditional
u(x).P message input
u〈M〉.P message output
A,B,C ::= extended processes
P plain process
A | B parallel composition
ν n.A name restriction
ν x.A variable restriction
{M/x} active substitution
Figure 3: Syntax for processes
3.2 Processes
Processes and extended processes are defined in Figure 3. The process 0 repre-
sents the null process that does nothing. P | Q denotes the parallel composition
of P with Q while !P denotes the unbounded replication of P (i.e. the un-
bounded parallel composition of P with itself). ν n.P creates a fresh name n
and the behaves like P . if φ then P else Q behaves like P if φ holds and like
Q otherwise. u(x).P inputs some message in the variable x on channel u and
then behaves like P while u〈M〉.P outputs M on channel u and then behaves
like P . We write ν u˜ for the (possibly empty) series of pairwise-distinct binders
ν u1. · · · .ν un. The active substitution {M/x} can replace the variable x for the
term M in every process it comes into contact with and this behaviour can be
controlled by restriction, in particular, the process ν x ({M/x} | P ) corresponds
exactly to let x = M in P . As in [10], we slightly extend the applied-pi calculus
by letting conditional branches now depend on formulae φ, ψ ::= M = N |M 6=
N | φ ∧ ψ. If M and N are ground, we define [[M = N ]] to be true if M =E N
and false otherwise. The semantics of [[ ]] is then extended to formulae in the
standard way.
The scope of names and variables are delimited by binders u(x) and ν (u).
Sets of bound names, bound variables, free names and free variables are respec-
tively written bn(A), bv(A), fn(A) and fv(A). Occasionally, we write fn(M)
(respectively fv(M)) for the set of names (respectively variables) which appear
in term M . An extended process is closed if all its variables are either bound
or defined by an active substitution.
An context C[_] is an extended process with a hole instead of an extended
process. We obtain C[A] as the result of filling C[_]’s hole with the extended
process A. An evaluation context is a context whose hole is not in the scope
of a replication, a conditional, an input or an output. A context C[_] closes A
when C[A] is closed.
A frame is an extended process built up from the null process 0 and active
substitutions composed by parallel composition and restriction. The domain of
a frame ϕ, denoted dom(ϕ) is the set of variables for which ϕ contains an active
Inria
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Par-0 A ≡ A | 0
Par-A A | (B | C) ≡ (A | B) | C
Par-C A | B ≡ B | A
Repl !P ≡ P | !P
New-0 ν n.0 ≡ 0
New-C ν u.ν w.A ≡ ν w.ν u.A
New-Par A | ν u.B ≡ ν u.(A | B)
where u 6∈ fv(A) ∪ fn(A)
Alias ν x.{M/x} ≡ 0
Subst {M/x} | A ≡ {M/x} | A{M/x}
Rewrite {M/x} ≡ {N/x}
where M =E N
Figure 4: Structural equivalence.
substitution {M/x} such that x is not under restriction. Every extended process
A can be mapped to a frame ϕ(A) by replacing every plain process in A with 0.
3.3 Operational semantics
The operational semantics of processes in the applied pi calculus is defined by
three relations : structural equivalence (≡), internal reduction (→) and labelled
reduction ( α→). These relations are satisfying the rules in Figure 5 and are
defined such that :
Structural equivalence is defined in Figure 4. It is closed by α-conversion of
both bound names and bound variables, and closed under application of eval-
uation contexts. The internal reductions and labelled reductions are defined
in Figure 5. They are closed under structural equivalence and application of
evaluation contexts. Internal reductions represent evaluation of condition and
internal communication between processes. Labelled reductions represent com-
munications with the environment.
3.4 Equivalences
Privacy properties are often stated as equivalence relations [11]. Intuitively, if a
protocol preserves ballot secrecy, an attacker should not be able to distinguish
between a scenario where a voter votes 0 from a scenario where the voter votes 1.
Static equivalence formally expresses indistinguishability of sequences of terms.
Definition 1 (Static equivalence). Two closed frames ϕ and ψ are statically
equivalent, denoted ϕ ≈s ψ, if dom(ϕ) = dom(ψ) and there exists a set of
names n˜ and substitutions σ, τ such that ϕ ≡ ν n˜.σ and ψ ≡ ν n˜.τ and for all
terms M,N such that n˜ ∩ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ∅, we have Mσ =E Nσ holds if
and only if Mτ =E Nτ holds. Two closed extended processes A,B are statically
equivalent, written A ≈s B, if their frames are statically equivalent; that is,
ϕ(A) ≈s ϕ(B).
Example 3.2. Consider the signature and equational theory Eenc defined in Ex-
ample 3.1. Let ϕ1 = ν k.σ1 and ϕ2 = ν k.σ2 where σ1 = {penc(s1,r1,pk(k))/x1 , pk(k)/x2},
RR n° 7781
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(Comm) c〈x〉.P | c(x).Q −→ P | Q
(Then) if φ then P else Q→ P if [[φ]] = true
(Else) if φ then P else Q→ Q otherwise
(In) c(x).P
c(M)−−−→ P{M/x}
(Out-Atom) c〈u〉.P c〈u〉−−−→ P
(Open-Atom)
A
c〈u〉−−−→ A′ u 6= c
ν u.A
ν u.c〈u〉−−−−−→ A′
(Scope)
A
α−→ A′ u does not occur in α
ν u.A
α−→ ν u.A′
(Par)
A
α−→ A′ bv(α) ∩ fv(B) = bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅
A | B α−→ A′ | B
(Struct)
A ≡ B B α−→ B′ B′ ≡ A′
A
α−→ A′
where α is a label of the form c(M), c〈u〉, or ν u.c〈u〉 such that u is either a
channel name or a variable of base type.
Figure 5: Semantics for processes
σ2 = {penc(s2,r2,pk(k))/x1 , pk(k)/x2} and s1, s2, k are names. We have that
ϕ1 6≈s ϕ2. Indeed, we penc(s1, r1, x2)σ1 =E x1σ1 but penc(s1, r1, x2)σ2 6=E x1σ2
However, we have that ν k, r1.σ1 ≈s ν k, r2.σ2.
Observational equivalence is the active counterpart of static equivalence,
where the attacker can actively interact with the processes. The definition of
observational equivalence requires to reason about all contexts (i.e. all adver-
saries), which renders the proofs difficult. Since observational equivalence has
been shown to coincide [3, 18] with labelled bisimilarity, we adopt the later in
this paper.
Definition 2 (Labelled bisimilarity). Labelled bisimilarity (≈l) is the largest
symmetric relation R on closed extended processes such that ARB implies:
1. A ≈s B;
2. if A −→ A′, then B −→∗ B′ and A′RB′ for some B′;
3. if A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅, then
B −→∗ α−→−→∗ B′ and A′RB′ for some B′.
Examples of labelled bisimilar processes will be provided in Section 5.
Inria
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4 Modelling the protocol in applied-pi calculus
We now provide a formal specification of the protocol, using the framework of
the applied-pi calculus, defined in the previous section. The first step consists
in modeling the cryptographic primitives used by the protocol.
4.1 Equational theory
We adopt the following signature to capture the cryptographic primitives used
by the protocol.
Σsign = {Ok, fst, hash, p, pk, s, snd, vk, blind, d, dec,+, ∗, ◦, , pair,
renc, sign, unblind, checkpfk1, checkpfk2, checksign, penc, pfk1, pfk2}
with function Ok is a constant ; fst, hash, p, pk, s, snd, vk are unary functions ;
blind, d, dec, +, ∗, ◦, , pair, renc, sign, unblind are binary functions ; checkpfk1,
checkpfk2, checksign, penc are ternary functions and pfk1, pfk2 are quaternary
functions.
The term pk(K) denotes the public key corresponding to the secret key K in
asymmetric encryption. Terms s(I), p(I), and vk(I) are respectively the blinding
factor, the parameter and the verification key associated to a secret id I. The
specific coding function used by the receipt generator for a voter with secret id
I, applied to a message M is represented by d(p(I),M). It corresponds to the
function dI(M) explained in Section 2.2. The term blind(M,N) the message
M blinded by N . Unblinded such a blinded term P , using the same blinding
factor N is denoted by unblind(P,N). The term penc(M,N,P ) refers to the
encryption of plaintext M using random nonce N and public key P . The term
M ◦ N denotes the homomorphic combination of ciphertexts M and M ′ and
the corresponding operation on plaintexts is written P Q and R ∗S on nonces.
The decryption of ciphertext C using secret key K is denoted dec(C,K). The
term renc(M,K) is the re-encryption of the ciphertext M using a secret key K
and leads to another ciphertext of the same plaintext with the same nonce but
a different public key. The operation between secret keys is denoted by K + L.
The term sign(M,N) refers to the signature of the message M using secret id
N . The term pfk1(M,N,P,Q) represents a proof of knowledge that proves that
Q is a ciphertext on the plaintext P using nonce N . The term pfk2(M,N,P,Q)
denotes another proof of knowledge proving that Q is either a re-encryption or
a masking of a term P using a secret key or nonce N . We introduce tuples using
pairings and, for convenience, pair(M1, pair(. . . , pair(Mn−1,Mn))) is abbreviated
as (M1, . . . ,Mn) and fst(sndi−1(M)) is denoted Πi with i ∈ N.
The properties of the primitives are then modelled by equipping the sig-
nature with an equational theory E that asserts functions +, ∗, ◦ and  are
commutative and associative, and includes the equations defined in Figure 6.
The three first equations are quite standard. Equation (4) allows to decrypt a
blinded ciphertext in order to get the corresponding blinded plaintext. Equa-
tion (5) models the homomorphic combination of ciphertexts. Equation (6)
represents the re-encryption of a ciphertext. The operation of unblinding is de-
scribed through Equation (7). Equations (8), (9) and (10) allows respectively
the verification of signatures and proofs of knowledge for pfk1 and pfk2 proofs.
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fst(pair(x, y)) = x (1)
snd(pair(x, y)) = y (2)
dec(penc(xplain, xrand, pk(xsk)), xsk) = xplain (3)
dec(blind(penc(xplain, xrand, pk(xsk)), xblind), xsk) = blind(xplain, xblind) (4)
penc(xpl, xrand, xpub) ◦ penc(ypl, yrand, xpub) =
penc(xpl  ypl,xrand ∗ yrand, xpub) (5)
renc(penc(xplain, xrand, pk(xsk)), ysk) =
penc(xplain,xrand, pk(xsk + ysk)) (6)
unblind(blind(xplain, xblind), xblind) = xplain (7)
checksign(xplain, vk(xid), sign(xplain, xid)) = Ok (8)
checkpfk1(vk(xid), ball, pfk1(xid, xrand, xplain, ball)) = Ok
where ball = penc(xplain, xrand, xpub) (9)
checkpfk2(vk(xid), ball, pfk2(xid, xbk, xplain, ball)) = Ok
where ball = renc(xplain, xbk) or ball = blind(xplain, xbk) (10)
Figure 6: Equations for encryption, blinding, signature amd proof of knowledge.
4.2 Norwegian protocol process specification
The description of the processes representing the actors of the protocol makes
use of auxiliary checks that are defined in Figure 7. For simplicity, we did not
model re-voting.
The voting process V represents both the voter and his computer. It is
parametrized by a free variable xvote representing voter’s vote and free names
cauth, cRV which denote the channel shared with the voter and, respectively, the
ballot box and the receipt generator. g1 is a variable representing the public key
of the election, id is the secret id of the voter and idpR is a variable representing
the verification key of the receipt generator. Note that messages sent over cauth
and cRV are also sent on the public channel cout to the adversary, to simulate
authenticated but not confidential channels.
φb(idi, x) = [(Π1(x),Π2(x),Π3(x)) = x
∧checksign((Π1(x),Π2(x)), vk(idi),Π3(x)) = Ok
∧ checkpfk1(vk(idi),Π1(x),Π2(x)) = Ok]
φs(idpR, x, y) = [checksign(x, idpR, y) = Ok]
φv(idpR, idi, x, y, v, z) = [checksign(x, idpR, y) = Ok ∧ d(p(idi), blind(v, s(idi))) = z]
(∀k = 1..3, xki = Πk(Π1(x)), ∀k = 4..7, xki = Πk−2(x))
φr(idpi, x) = [(x
1
i , x
2
i , x
3
i ) = Π1(x) ∧ (Π1(x), x4i , x5i , x6i , x7i ) = x
∧ checksign((x1i , x2i ), idpi, x3i ) = Ok ∧ checkpfk1(idpi, x1i , x2i ) = Ok
∧ checkpfk2(idpi, x4i , x5i ) = Ok ∧ checkpfk2(idpi, x6i , x7i ) = Ok]
Figure 7: Auxiliary checks performed by the participants to the protocol.
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V (cauth , cout, cRV , g1, id, idpR, xvote) = ν t .
let e = penc(xvote, t, g1) in
let p = pfk1(id, t, xvote, e) in
let si = sign((e, p), id) in
cout〈(e, p, si)〉 .
cauth〈(e, p, si)〉 . % encrypted ballot sent to B
cRV (x) . cauth(y) .
cout〈x〉 . cout〈y〉 .
let hv = hash((vk(id), e, p, si)) in % recomputes what should
be sent by R
if φv(idpR, id, h, x, xvote, y) then cauth〈Ok〉 % checks validity
Process Bn corresponds to the ballot box, ready to listen to n voters. The
ballots are coming from authenticated channels c1, . . . , cn and the ballot box can
send messages to the receipt generator, the decryption service and the auditor
through secure channels cBR, cBD and cBA. The parameters of the ballot box
are keys : g1, g3 (public) and a2 (secret); public ids of voters idp1, . . . , idpn (i.e.
verification keys) and corresponding blinding factors s1, . . . , sn. (Step c(sy1) is
a technical synchronisation, it does not appear in the real specification.)
Bn(cBR, cBD, g1, a2, g3, idpR, c1, idp1, s1, . . . , cn, idpn, sn) =
. . . . ci(xi) .
if φb(idpi, xi) then % checks validity of ballot
let ei = renc(Π1(xi), a2) in
let pfkei = pfk2(idpi, a2,Π1(xi), ei) in
let bi = blind(ei, si) in
let pfk bi = pfk2(idpi, si, ei, bi) in % computes re-encrypted masked
ballot and corresponding proofs.
cBR〈(xi, ei, pfkei , bi, pfkbi )〉.cBR(yi). % message sent to R
let hbi = hash((vk(idi),Π1(xi),Π2(xi),Π3(xi))) in
if φs(idpR, hbi, yi) then % checks validity of confirmation
ci〈yi〉 . ci(syi) . . . % transmit confirmation to the voter
cn〈yn〉 . cn(syn) .
cBD〈Π1(x1)〉 . . . . . cBD〈Π1(xn)〉 . % output encrypted votes to the
Decryption Service
cBA〈x1〉 . . . . . cBA〈xn〉 % output the content to the Auditor
Receipt generator’s process is denoted by Rn. It deals with the ballot box
and the auditor through secure channels cBR and cRA and directly with voters
through out-of-band channels cRV1 , . . . , cRVn . It is parametrized with keys: g1,
g2 (public) and a3 (secret); the public ids of voters and corresponding receipt
coding functions parametrized by pr1, . . . , prn.
Rn(cBR, g1, g2, a3, idR, cRV1 , idp1, pr1, . . . , cRVn , idpn, prn) =
. . . . cBR(xi) .
let xki = Πk(Π1(xi)), k = 1..3 in
let xki = Πk−2(xi), k = 4...7 in
if φr(idpi, xi) then % checks ballot box’s computations
let hbr i = hash((idpi, x1i , x2i , x3i )) in
let hbpr i = hash((idpi, x1i , x2i )) in
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let ri = d(pri, dec(x6i , a3)) in % computes the receipt code for V
let sigi = sign(hbri, idR) in % computes confirmation for B
cRVi〈ri〉 . cBR〈sigi〉 . . . .
cRVn〈rn〉 . cBR〈sign〉 . . . .
cRA〈(idp1, hbpr1, hbr1)〉 . . . . . cRA〈(idpn, hbprn, hbrn)〉
% output content to the Auditor
The decryption service is represented by process Dn. Communicating se-
curely with the ballot box and the auditor through channels cBD and cDA, it
also outputs results through public channel cout. In order to decrypt ballots, it
needs to know the secret key a1. We model two processes, one including a swap
between the two first votes, to model the shuﬄing which is necessary to ensure
ballot secrecy.
Dn(cBD, cDA, cout, a1) =
cBD(x1) . . . . . cBD(xn) .
cDA〈hash((x1, . . . , xn))〉 . cDA(x) . % creating hash of ciphertexts and
waiting for auditor’s approval
let deck = dec(xk, a1), k = 1..n in % decryption of ciphertexts
cout〈dec1〉 . . . . . cout〈decn〉 % publication of results
Dn(cBD, cDA, cout, a1) =
cBD(x1) . . . . . cBD(xn) .
cDA〈hash((x1, . . . , xn))〉 . cDA(x) .
let dec1 = dec(x2, a1) in % the swap between the two first
let dec2 = dec(x1, a1) in votes is modelled here
let deck = dec(xk, a1), k = 3..n in
cout〈dec1〉 . . . . . cout〈decn〉
Finally, the auditor process, ADn, communicates with the other infrastruc-
ture players using secure channels cBA, cRA and cDA. It knows public ids of
voters.
ADn(cBA, cRA, cDA, idp1, . . . , idpn) =
cDA(hd) . % input of contents of B, R and D
cBA(x1) . . . . . cBA(xn) . cRA(h1) . . . . . cRA(h1) .
let hbai = hash((Π1(xi),Π2(xi),Π3(xi))) in
let hbpai = hash((Π1(xi),Π2(xi))) in
let ha = hash((Π1(x1), . . . ,Πn(xn))) in
if φa(x1, h1, idp1, . . . , xn, hn, idpn, h, hd) then cDA〈Ok〉 else 0
% checks and approval sent to D.
where φa(x1, h1, idp1, . . . , xn, hn, idpn, h, hd) = [(Π1(xi),Π2(xi),Π3(xi)) = xi
∧(Π1(hi),Π2(hi),Π3(hi)) = hi ∧ Π2(hi) = hbpi ∧Π3(hi) = hbi ∧ hd = h
∧ checksign((Π1(xi),Π2(xi)), idpi,Π3(xi)) = Ok]
The interaction of all the players is simply modelled by considering all the
processes in parallel, with the correct instantiation and restriction of the pa-
rameters. In what follows, the restricted name a1, a2, a3 model secret keys
used in the protocol and public keys pk(a1), pk(a2) and pk(a3) are added in
the process frame. The restricted name c1, c2 and cRV1 , cRV2 model authentic
channels between honest voters and, respectively, the ballot box and the receipt
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generator. The restricted name id1, id2, idR represent secret ids of honest voters
and receipt generator, the corresponding public id’s are added in the process’s
frame.
Then the setting of the authorities is modelled by An [_] where n is the
number of voters and the hole is the voter place. An [_] is the analogue of
An [_] with the Decryption service swapping the two first votes (its use will be
clearer in the next section, when defining vote privacy).
n˜ = (a1, a2, id1, id2, idR, c1, c2, cRV1 , cRV2 , cBR, cBD, cBA, cRA, cDA)
Γ = {pk(a1)/g1 , pk(a2)/g2 , pk(a3)/g3 , vk(id1)/idp1 , . . . ,vk(idn) /idpn , vk(idR)/idpR}
An [_] = ν n˜ .(let a3 = a1 + a2 in [_|Bn{s(id1)/s1 , · · · ,s(idn) /sn}
|Rn{p(id1)/pr1 , · · · ,p(idn) /prn}|Dn|ADn|Γ])
An [_] = ν n˜ .(let a3 = a1 + a2 in [_|Bn{s(id1)/s1 , · · · ,s(idn) /sn}
|Rn{p(id1)/pr1 , · · · ,p(idn) /prn}|Dn|ADn|Γ])
The frame Γ represents the initial knowledge of the attacker: it has access
to the public keys of the authorities and the verification keys of the voters.
Moreover, since only the two first voters are assumed to be honest, only their
two secret ids are restricted (in n˜). The attacker has therefore access to the
secret ids of all the other voters. Parameters of subprocesses are left implicit
except for s1, . . . , sn for the ballot box and pr1, . . . , prn for the receipt generator
which are respectively replaced by s(id1), . . . , s(idn), the blinding factors, and
p(id1), . . . , p(idn), used to distinguish the coding dunction associated to a voter.
5 Formal analysis of ballot secrecy
Our analysis shows that the Norwegian e-voting protocol preserves ballot se-
crecy, even when all but two voters are corrupted, provided that the other
components are honest. We also identified several cases of corruption that are
subject to attacks. Though not surprising, these cases were not previously men-
tioned in the literature.
5.1 Ballot secrecy with corrupted voters
Ballot secrecy has been formalized in terms of equivalence by Delaune, Kremer,
and Ryan in [11]. A protocol with voting process V (v, id) and authority pro-
cess A preserves ballot secrecy if an attacker cannot distinguish when votes are
swapped, i.e. it cannot distinguish when a voter a1 votes v1 and a2 votes v2
from the case where a1 votes v2 and a2 votes v1. This is formally specified by:
νn˜.(A | V {v2/x,a1 /y | V {v1/x,a2 /y}) ≈l νn˜.(A | V {v1/x,a1 /y | V {v2/x,a2 /y})
We are able to show that the Norwegian protocol preserves ballot secrecy,
even all but two voters are corrupted.
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Theorem 3. Let n be the number of voters. The Norwegian e-voting protocol
process specification satisfies ballot secrecy with the auditing process, even with
n− 2 voters are corrupted, provided that the other components are honest.
An[V {c1/cauth ,cRV1 /cRV }σ | V {c2/cauth ,cRV2 /cRV }τ ]
≈l An [V {c1/cauth ,cRV1 /cRV }τ |V {c2/cauth ,cRV2 /cRV }σ]
where σ = {v1/xvote} and τ = {v2/xvote}.
We can also show ballot secrecy, without an auditor. This means that the
auditor does not contribute to ballot secrecy in case the administrative compo-
nents are honest (which was expected). Formally, we define A′n [_] and An [_]
′
to be the analog of An [_] and An [_], removing the auditor.
Theorem 4. Let n be the number of voters. The Norwegian e-voting protocol
process specification satisfies ballot secrecy without the auditing process, even
with n− 2 voters are corrupted, provided that the other components are honest.
A′n[V {c1/cauth ,cRV1 /cRV }σ | V {c2/cauth ,cRV2 /cRV }τ ]
≈l A′n [V {c1/cauth ,cRV1 /cRV }τ |V {c2/cauth ,cRV2 /cRV }σ]
where σ = {v1/xvote} and τ = {v2/xvote}.
The proof of Theorems 3 and 4 works in two main steps. First we guess
a relation R such that for any two processes P,Q in relation (PRQ) any
move of P can be matched by a move of Q such that the resulting processes
remain in relation. This amounts to characterize all possible successors of
An[V {c1/cauth ,cRV1 /cRV }σ | V {c2/cauth ,cRV2 /cRV }τ ] andAn[V {c1/cauth ,cRV1 /cRV }τ
|V {c2/cauth ,cRV2 /cRV }σ]. We show in particular that whenever the attacker sends
a term N that is accepted by the ballot box for a voter with secret id id, then
N is necessarily an id - valid ballot for the following definition.
Definition 5. Let id ∈ {id1, . . . , idn}. A term N is said to be a id - valid ballot
if φb(id,N) = true, equivalently : N = (N1, N2, N3)checksign((N1, N2), vk(id), N3) =E Ok
checkpfk1(vk(id), N1, N2) =E Ok
.
The second and most involved step of the proof consists in showing that the
sequences of messages observed by the attacker remain in static equivalence.
This requires to prove an infinite number of static equivalences. Let us introduce
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some notations.
θsub = {pk(a1)/g1}|{pk(a2)/g2}|{pk(a3)/g3}|{vk(idR)/idpR}|{ball1/b1}|{ballo2/b2}|
{{vk(idi)/idpi}| i = 1..n}|{{d(p(idi),dec(blind(renc(Π1(xi),a2),s(idi)),a3))/yi}|
{sign(hash((vk(idi),xi)),idR)/zi}| i = 1..n}
ΣL = {v1/x1vote ,v2 /x2vote}
ΣR = {v2/x1vote ,v1 /x2vote}
θct = {dec(Π1(x1),a1)/result1 ,dec(Π1(x2),a1) /result2 ,dec(Π1(xi),a1) /resulti |i = 3..n}
θct = {dec(Π1(x2),a1)/result1 ,dec(Π1(x1),a1) /result2 ,dec(Π1(xi),a1) /resulti |i = 3..n}
where ball1 and ball2 are the terms sent by the two honest voters.
The frame θsub represents the messages sent over the (public) network during
the submission phase. ΣL represents the scenario where voter 1 votes v1 and
voter 2 votes v2 while ΣL represents the opposite scenario. thetact and θct
represent the results published by the decryption service.
All voters with secret id idi with i ≥ 3 are corrupted. Therefore, the at-
tacker can submit any deducible term as a ballot, that is any term that can be
represented by Ni with fv(Ni) ⊆ dom(θ)\{yj , zj}j≥i (i.e. a recipe that can only
re-use previously received messages). We are able to show that whenever the
message submitted by the attacker is accepted by the ballot box, then NiθiΣ is
necessarily an idi-valid ballots for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR}.
A key result of our proof is that the final frames are in static equivalence,
for any behavior of the corrupted users (reflected in the Ni).
Proposition 6. Let NiθiΣ be idi-valid ballots for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} and i ∈
{3, . . . , n}, we have:
νn˜.(θsub |θct)σN˜ΣL ≈s νn˜.(θsub |θct)σN˜ΣR.
where σN˜ = {ball1/x1 , ball2/x2 , Nj/xj | j ∈ {3, . . . , n}}.
5.2 Attacks
Our two previous results of ballot secrecy hold provided all the administrative
components (bulletin box, receipt generator, decryption service, and auditor)
behave honestly. However, in order to enforce the level of trust, the voting
system should remain secure even if some administrative components are cor-
rupted. We describe below two cases of corruption where ballot secrecy is no
longer guaranteed.
Dishonest decryption service. The decryption service is a very sensitive
component since it has access to the decryption key a1 of the public key used for
the election. Therefore, a corrupted decryption service can very easily decrypt
all encrypted ballots and thus learns the votes as soon as he has access to the
communication between the voters and the bulletin box (these communications
being conducted on the public Internet network). Even if we did not find any
explicit mention of this, we believe that the designers of the protocol implicitly
assume that a corrupted decryption would not be able to control (some of) the
communication over the Internet. However, a corrupted decryption service can
learn the votes even without access to Internet. Indeed, the ballots are sent by
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the bulletin box in the same order they arrived to the bulletin box. Assume for
example that the decryption service knows that Alice has voted first (or last). It
can then very easily learns her vote when decrypting the first ballot it receives.
More generally, provided the decryption service has access to some information
on the order of the votes, it then gains some knowledge on the votes.
Dishonest bulletin box and receipt generator. Clearly, if the bulletin
box and the receipt generator collude, they can compute a1 = a3 − a2 and
they can then decrypt all incoming encrypted ballots. More interestingly, a
corrupted receipt generator does not need the full cooperation of the bulletin
box for breaking ballot secrecy. Indeed, assume that the receipt generator has
access, for some voter V , to the blinding factor sV used by the bulletin to blind
the ballot. Recall that the receipt generator retrieves f(o)sV when generating
the receipt codes (by computing wˇxˇ−a3). Therefore, the receipt generator can
compute f(o′)sV for any possible voting option o′. Comparing with the obtained
values with f(o)sV it would easily deduce the chosen option o. Of course, the
more blinding factors the receipt generator can get, the more voters it can
attack. Therefore, the security of the protocol strongly relies on the security of
the blinding factors which generation and distribution are left unspecified in the
documentation. The bulletin box can also perform a similar attack, provided
it can learn some coding function dV and additionally, provided that it has
access to the SMS sent by the receipt generator, which is probably a too strong
corruption scenario.
6 Further corruption cases using ProVerif
In order to study further corruption cases, we have used ProVerif, the only
tool that can analyse equivalence properties in the context of security protocols.
Of course, we needed to simplify the equational theory since ProVerif does
not handle associative and commutative (AC) symbols and our theory needs
four of them. So we have considered the theory E′ defined by the equations
of Figure 6, except equation (5) that represents homomorphic combination of
ciphertexts and we have replaced AC symbols + and ∗ by free function symbols
f and g. Using this simplified theory, it is clear that we can miss some attacks,
but testing corruption assumptions is still relevant even if the attacker is a bit
weaker than in our first study.
As ProVerif is designed to prove equivalences between processes that differ
only by terms, we need to use another tool, ProSwapper [15], to model the
shuﬄe done by the decryption service. More precisely, we actually used their
algorithm to compute directly a shuﬄe in our ProVerif specification.
The results are displayed in Table 1 and 2 and have been obtained with
a standard (old) laptop1. In these tables, X indicates that ballot secrecy is
satisfied, × shows that there is an attack, and - indicates that ProVerif was not
able to conclude. No indication of times means that we do not proceed to a test
in ProVerif but, as we already knew that there was an attack. In particular, all
the attacks described in Section 5.2 are displayed in the tables.
Our case study with ProVerif indicates that ballot secrecy is still preserved
even when the Receipt Generator is corrupted (as well as several voters), at
12.00 Ghz processor with 2 GB of RAM Memory
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Table 1: Results and computation times for the protocol without auditor.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhCorr. Players
Corr. Voters 0 1 2 5 10
None X X X X X0.4" 0.9" 2.4" 16.1" 20’59"
Ballot Box (B) ->1h
Receipt Generator (R) X X X X X1.1" 2.4" 5.7" 1’15" 39’30"
Decryption Service (D) × ×0.2"
B + R × ×0.3"
D+B, D+R, D+R+B x
Table 2: Results and computation times for the protocol with auditor.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhCorr. Players
Corr. Voters 0 1 2 3 4
None X X X X X0.6" 1,8" 4.1" 27.7" 11’1"
Ballot Box (B) ->1h
Receipt Generator (R) X X X X X1.1" 1.9" 5.9" 29.1" 10’33"
Auditor (A) X X X X X0.4" 1.9" 2.6" 5.8" 12.1"
R + A X X X X X0.6" 1.9" 5.5" 14.5" 34.4"
B+R, B+R+A, D x
D + any other combination
least in the simplified theory. Unfortunately, ProVerif was not able to conclude
in the case the Ballot Box is corrupted.
7 Discussion
We have proposed the first formal proof that the e-voting protocol recently used
in Norway indeed satisfies ballot secrecy, even when all but two voters are cor-
rupted and even without the auditor. As expected, ballot secrecy is no longer
guaranteed if both the bulletin box and the receipt generator are corrupted.
Slightly more surprisingly, the protocol is not secure either if the decryption
service is corrupted, as discussed in Section 5.2. More cases of corruption need
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to be studied, in particular when the bulletin board alone is corrupted, we leave
this as future work. In addition, it remains to study other security properties
such as coercion-resistance or verifiability. Instead of doing additional (long and
technical) proofs, a further step consists in developing a procedure for automat-
ically checking for equivalences. Of course, this is a difficult problem. A first
decision procedure has been proposed in [9] but is limited to subterm convergent
theories. An implementation has recently been proposed [8] but it does not sup-
port such a complex equational theory. An alternative step would be to develop
a sound procedure that over-approximate the relation, losing completeness in
the spirit of ProVerif [6] but tailored to privacy properties.
We would like to emphasize that the security proofs have been conducted in
a symbolic thus abstract model. This provides a first level of certification, ruling
out “logical” attacks. However, a full computational proof should be developed,
identifying in particular the security assumptions.
It is also important to note that the security of the protocol strongly relies
on the way initial secrets are pre-distributed. For example, three private de-
cryption keys a1, a2, a3 (such that a1 +a2 = a3) need to be securely distributed
among (respectively) the bulletin board, the receipt generator and the decryp-
tor. Also, a table (id, s(id)) containing the blinding factor for each voter needs
to be securely distributed to bulletin board and a table (id, did) containing a
permutation for each voter needs to be securely distributed to the receipt gen-
erator. Moreover, anyone with access with both the codes mailed to the voters
and to the SMS emitted by the receipt generator would immediately learn the
values of all the votes. We did not find in the documentation how and by who
all these secret values were distributed. It should certainly be clarified as it
could be a weak point of the system.
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A Proof of Static equivalence
A.1 Definitions and notations
Definition 7. Let N3, . . . , Nn be free terms. We use the following notations,
for n ∈ N, i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
ei = penc(x
i
vote, ti, pk(a1)) pfk i = pfk1(idi, ti, x
i
vote, ei)
sigi = sign((ei, pfk i), idi) balli = (ei, pfk i, sigi)
hvi = hash((vk(idi), ei, pfk i, sigi)) sj = s(idj)
e′j = renc(Π1(xj), a2) pfk
′
j = pfk2(idpj , a2,Π1(xj), e
′
j)
e′′j = blind(e
′
j , sj) pfk
′′
j = pfk2(idpj , sj , e
′
j , e
′′
j )
ball′j = (xj , e
′
j , pfk
′
j , e
′′
j , pfk
′′
j ) hbbj = hash((idpj , xj))
prj = p(idj) rj = d(prj , dec(Π6(pj), a3))
hbrj = hash((idpj ,Π1(pj),Π2(pj),Π3(pj))) sig
R
j = sign(hbrj , idR)
hbprj = hash((idpj ,Π1(pj),Π2(pj))) decj = dec(dj , a1)
σ = {v1/x1vote} τ = {v2/x1vote}
ΣL = {v1/x1vote ,v2 /x2vote} ΣR = {v2/x1vote ,v1 /x2vote}
R = {dec(Π1(x1),a1)/result1}|{dec(Π1(x2),a1)/result2}
R = {dec(Π1(x2),a1)/result1}|{dec(Π1(x1),a1)/result2}
θ = {pk(a1)/g1}|{pk(a2)/g2}|{pk(a3)/g3}|{vk(idR)/idpR}|{ballot1/b1}|{ballot2/b2}|
{{vk(idi)/idpi}| i = 1..n}|{{dec(Π1(xi),a1)/resulti}| i = 3..n}|
{{d(p(idi),dec(blind(renc(Π1(xi),a2),s(idi)),a3))/yi}|
{sign(hash((vk(idi),xi)),idR)/zi}| i = 1..n},
Some notation around θ (Note that θresn = θd) :
θd ={pk(a1)/g1}|{pk(a2)/g2}|{pk(a3)/g3}|{vk(idR)/idpR}|{{penc(x
vote
i ,ri,pk(a1))/ei}|
{pfk1(idi,ri,xvotei ,ei)/pfki}|{sign((ei,pfki),idi)/sigi}| i = 1, 2}|
{{vk(idi)/idpi}| i = 1..n}|{{d(p(idi),dec(blind(renc(Π1(xi),a2),s(idi)),a3))/yi}|
{sign(hash((vk(idi),xi)),idR)/zi}| i = 1..n}|{{dec(Π1(xi),a1)/resulti}| i = 3..n},
θd0 ={pk(a1)/g1}|{pk(a2)/g2}|{pk(a3)/g3}|{vk(idR)/idpR}|{{penc(x
vote
i ,ri,pk(a1))/ei}|
{pfk1(idi,ri,xvotei ,ei)/pfki}|{sign((ei,pfki),idi)/sigi}| i = 1, 2}|
{{vk(idi)/idpi}| i = 1..n},
θ1 = θ
d
0 ∪ {d(p(id1),dec(blind(renc(Π1(x1),a2),s(id1)),a3))/y1}
∪ {sign(hash((vk(id1),x1)),idR)/z1}
θi = θi−1 ∪ {d(p(idi),dec(blind(renc(Π1(xi),a2),s(idi)),a3))/yi}
∪ {sign(hash((vk(idi),xi)),idR)/zi}
θres3 = θn ∪ {dec(Π1(x3),a1)/result3}
θresi = θ
res
i−1 ∪ {dec(Π1(xi),a1)/resulti} for i = 4..n.
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Given N3, . . . , Nk such that NiθiΣ is an idi-valid ballots for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} and
i ∈ {3, . . . , k}, we define :
σk
N˜
= {ballot1/x1 , ballot2/x2 , Nj/xj | j ∈ {3, . . . , k}}
σn
N˜
= σN˜
A.2 Proving static equivalence
Our aim is to prove this proposition :
Proposition 6. Let NiθiΣ be idi-valid ballots for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} and i ∈
{3, . . . , n}, we have:
νn˜.(θsub |θct)σN˜ΣL ≈s νn˜.(θsub |θct)σN˜ΣR.
where σN˜ = {ball1/x1 , ball2/x2 , Nj/xj | j ∈ {3, . . . , n}}.
Since one can see that, with notations defined above, θsub |θct = θ|R and
θsub |θct = θ|R, we will prove this proposition which is equivalent :
Proposition 8. Let NiθiΣ be idi-valid ballots for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} and i ∈
{3, . . . , n}, we have :
νn˜.(θ|R)σN˜ΣL ≈s νn˜.(θ|R)σN˜ΣR.
Let us introduce useful lemmas in order to do the proof of the proposition
8.
Lemma 9. Let φ = νn˜.θ and φ′ = νn˜.θ′ be frames such that θ = θ′ ∪ {Mθ′/y}
with free M . Then :
φΣL ≈s φΣR ⇐⇒ φ′ΣL ≈s φ′ΣR.
Proof. =⇒ Let N , P be terms such that (fn(N)∪ fn(P ))∩ n˜ = ∅ and fv(N)∪
fv(P ) ∈ dom(θ′). Suppose thatNθ′ΣL =E Pθ′ΣL. We also haveNθΣL =E
PθΣL and, since φΣL ≈s φΣR, then NθΣR =E PθΣR. As fv(N)∪fv(P ) ∈
dom(θ′), we finally have Nθ′ΣR =E Pθ′ΣR.
⇐= Let N , P be terms such that (fn(N)∪ fn(P ))∩ n˜ = ∅ and fv(N)∪ fv(P ) ∈
dom(θ). Suppose that NθΣL =E PθΣL. There are two cases :
– If y /∈ fv(N)∪ fv(P ) then we have Nθ′ΣL =E Pθ′ΣL. Since φ′ΣL ≈s
φ′ΣR, then Nθ′ΣR =E Pθ′ΣR and, finally, NθΣR =E PθΣR.
– If y ∈ fv(N) ∪ fv(P ) then, suppose, w.l.o.g. that y ∈ fv(N), then
∃p such that N |p = y and we have N [M ]pθ′ = Nθ. Thus, we have
: NθΣL =E N [M ]pθ′ΣL =E Pθ′ΣL =E PθΣL. (y /∈ fv(P ) other-
wise we substitute all y by M in P as done in N .) Using the fact
that φ′ΣL ≈s φ′ΣR, we have N [M ]pθ′ΣR =E Pθ′ΣR and, finally,
NθΣR =E PθΣR.
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Lemma 10. Let φ2 = νn˜.θ2. Then, we have :
φ2σ
2
N˜
ΣL ≈s φ2σ2N˜ΣR.
Proof. Note that the adversary can arbitrarily combine ciphertexts from the
frame with ciphertexts in the frame or freshly constructed ciphertexts, thus we
enrich the frame φdev with any such combination of ciphertexts. Formally, for
any α1, α2 ∈ N and free terms K,P,R, we define Cα1,α2,K,P,R as follows :
penc(P 2i=1 αi.xvotei , R ∗2i=1 rαii , pk(aδ
′(α1,α2)
1 +K))
with δ′(a, b) = 0 if a = b = 0 and δ′(a, b) = 1 otherwise, a01 = , the null term,
and a11 = a1. We define the extended frame φe below.
φe =νn˜.(θ
d
2 |{Cα1,α2,K,P,R/xα1,α2,K,P,R | α1, α2 ∈ N and terms K,P,R such that
(fn(K) ∪ fn(P ) ∪ fn(R)) ∩ n˜ = ∅, fv(K,P,R) ⊆ dom(φe).})
Note that φe is infinite. Using Lemma 9, it is sufficient to show φeΣL ≈s φeΣR.
We introduce the following two claims.
Claim 1. Let M be a term such that fv(M) ⊆ dom(φe) = ∅ and fn(M)∩ n˜ =
∅. If MφeΣ −→ U for some Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR}, then there exists N such that
U =AC NφeΣ and MφeΣ′ −→ NφeΣ′ for any Σ′ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR}.
Claim 2. Let M , N be two terms such that (fv(M)∪ fv(N)) ⊆ dom(φe) = ∅
and fn(M,N) ∩ n˜ = ∅. If MφeΣ =AC NφeΣ for some Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR}, then
Mφe =AC Nφe.
The above claims allow the construction of our proof. LetM , N be two terms
such that fn(M,N) ∩ n˜ = ∅, fv(M,N) ⊆ dom(φe) and MφeΣL =E NφeΣL.
Thus (MφeΣL)↓=AC (NφeΣL)↓. Applying repeatedly Claim 1, we deduce that
there exists M ′ such that (MφeΣL)↓=AC M ′φeΣL and MφeΣR −→∗ M ′φeΣR.
Similarly, there exists N ′ such that (NφeΣL)↓=AC N ′φeΣL and NφeΣR −→∗
N ′φeΣR. From M ′φeΣL =AC N ′φeΣL and Claim 2, we deduce M ′φe =AC
N ′φe. Therefore, M ′φeΣR =AC N ′φeΣR and thus MφeΣR =E NφeΣR.
Proof of Claim 1 : This result is proved by inspection of the rewrite rules.
More precisely, assume that MφeΣ −→ U for some Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR}. It means
that there exists a rewriting rule l −→ r ∈ RE and a position p such that
MφeΣ|p =AC lθ for some θ. p cannot occur below M since φeΣ is in normal
form. If M |p = lθ′ for some θ′ then we conclude that we can rewrite M as
expected. The only interesting case is thus when M |p is not an instance of l
but MφeΣ|p is. By inspection of the rules, l −→ r can only correspond to one
of the five equations (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7). The case of equations (3) or (4)
is ruled out by the fact that a1 is not deducible from φeΣ. This is the same
for the case of equation (7) since idi are not deducible from φeΣ. If the rule
is corresponding to (5), then it must be the case that M |p = x ◦ y with x, y
variables of dom(φe). By construction of φe, we have that (x ◦ y)φe → zφe
(applying the rule corresponding to Equation (5)), thus the result. The last
case is when the rule is corresponding to Equation (6). This must be the case
thatM |p = renc(x,K) with x ∈ dom(φe) and K a term such that fn(K)∩ n˜ = ∅
and fv(K) ⊆ dom(φe). By construction of φe, we have that renc(x,K) → yφe
and we have the result.
Proof of Claim 2 : Assume by contradiction that there exist M , N two
terms such that MφeΣ =AC NφeΣ for some Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} and Mφe 6=AC
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Nφe. Consider M , N two minimal terms that satisfy this property. By case
inspection, it must be the case thatM and N are both variables. Thus, we have
xφeΣ =AC yφeΣ and xφe 6=AC yφe with x, y ∈ dom(φe) and x 6= y. Then, we
have head(xφeΣ) ∈ {blind, penc, pfk1, sign}. But, by construction of φe, Σ does
not change the randomness used in penc or in pfk1 and the secret ids in blind
or sign, thus, randomness or id uniquely determine the variable, which implies
x = y, contradiction.
Lemma 11. We have :
• νn˜.θ 0 ai + U , for i = 1, 3 and any term U .
• νn˜.θ 0 ri ∗ U , for i = 1, 2 and any term U .
• νn˜.θ 0 idi, for i = 1, 2.
• νn˜.θ 0 p(idi), for i = 1, 2.
Proof. We define four properties :
1. Let N be a deducible term such that ∃ p such that N |p = ai + U for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and any term U . There are two cases :
• U =  (ai +  = ai) and p = p′.2 such that N |p′ = f(N ′, ai) with
f ∈ {dec, renc}.
• p = p′.1.q such that N |p′ =AC pk(ai + U ′) for some U ′ and ∀ q′ < q,
head(N |p′.1.q′) = +.
2. Let N be a deducible term such that ∃ p such that N |p = ri ∗ U for
i ∈ {1, 2} and any term U . There are two cases :
• p = p′.2.q such that N |p′ =AC penc(P1, ri ∗ U,K1) and ∀ q′ < q,
head(N |p′.2.q′) = ∗.
• p = p′.2.q such that N |p′ =AC pfk1(P1, ri ∗ U,P2, P3) and ∀ q′ < q,
head(N |p′.2.q′) = ∗.
3. Let N be a deducible term such that ∃ p such that N |p = idi for i ∈ {1, 2}.
There are four cases :
• p = p′.1 and N |p′ = vk(idi).
• p = p′.1 and N |p′ = p(idi).
• p = p′.1 and N |p′ = s(idi).
• p = p′.1 and N |p′ = pfk1(idi, P1, P2, P3).
• p = p′.2 and N |p′ = sign(N ′, idi).
4. Let N be a deducible term such that ∃ p such that N |p = p(idi) for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, p = p′.1 and N |p′ = d(p(idi),M).
We can see that these properties imply the undeducibility of ai + U , ri ∗ U ,
idi and p(idi). Let us prove these properties by induction on the number of
steps needed to deduce N .
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Base Case : All terms in the frame θ verify these properties.
Induction Hypothesis : Let M1, . . . ,Mk be terms in normal form, de-
ducible in i − 1 steps verifying the properties. We are going to prove that
f(M1, . . . ,Mk)↓ also verifies them. There are two main cases :
• If f(M1, . . . ,Mk) is in normal form, then it is obvious that the result is
true.
• If it is not in normal form, then, sinceM1, . . . ,Mk are in normal form, the
reduction occurs in head.
– If the applied rule is different from (4), (5) and (6), then the result
is a subterm of M1, . . . ,Mk and it is verifying the properties, using
the induction hypothesis.
– If the rule (4) is applied, then dec(M1,M2) −→ blind(T1, T2) with
T1 and T2 subterms of M1, M2 and are verifying the property by
induction hypothesis. Then, blind(T1, T2) verify the properties.
– If the rule (5) is applied, then ◦(M1,M2) −→ penc(T1◦T2, R1∗R2, P )
with T1, T2, R1, R2, P subterms of M1, M2. The result may be
not in normal form if head(T1) = head(T2) = penc and if encryp-
tions use the same key, then the rule (5) is applied again. It can
be applied several time, but the reduction will stop since M1 and
M2 are terms with fixed length. Then the result will be of the form
penc(. . . penc(T ′1 ◦T ′2, R′1 ∗R′2, P ′) . . . , R1 ∗R2, P ) where all terms are
subterms of M1 and M2. Then, each penc, in normal form, will ver-
ify the properties. Thus, the result, in normal form, is verifying the
properties too.
– Finally, if the rule (6) is applied, then renc(M1,M2) −→ penc(T,R,
pk(P1+P2)) with T , R, P1 and P2 subterms ofM1 andM2. Thanks to
the induction hypothesis, we can see that the the result is satisfying
the property. Indeed, whatever the case where ai is a subterm of P1
or P2, ∃ P ′ such that P1 + P2 =AC ai + P ′.
Note. If, ∀ U , ri ∗U and ai +U are not deducible, then using U =  such that
ri ∗ U = ri or ai + U = ai, we have that ri and ai are not deducible too.
Lemma 12. Let φ = νn˜.θn and N a minimal recipe of (Nφ)↓ such that N =
f(N1, . . . , Nk) with f ∈ {dec, fst, snd, unblind}. Then :
(Nφ)↓= f((N1φ)↓, . . . , (Nkφ)↓)
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Proof. Let us prove this by induction on the depth of N .
Base Case : N = f(N1, . . . , Nk) with N1, . . . , Nk variables or names.
• If f ∈ {fst, snd}, since @ x ∈ dom(φ) such that head(xφ) = pair, we
conclude immediately.
• If f = dec and N = dec(N1, N2), then N1 ∈ {e1, e2} but if there is a
reduction, it means that we have N2φ = a1 which is impossible as a1 is
not deducible by Lemma 11.
• If f = unblind and N = unblind(N1, N2), then N1 ∈ {y1, y2} since yk which
are reducing are removing from the frame. But if there is a reduction, it
means that we have N2φ = idi which is impossible as idi are not deducible
by Lemma 11.
Induction Hypothesis : We suppose that ∀ term M with a depth ≥ 1
satisfies the property. Let N = f(N1, . . . , Nk) of a depth equal to n+ 1 with Ni
of depths ≤ n. If f((N1φ)↓, . . . , (Nkφ)↓ is in normal form, we conclude easily.
Suppose that f((N1φ)↓, . . . , (Nkφ)↓ is not in normal form.
• If f ∈ {fst, snd} and N = f(N1). The case where N1 is a variable is
excluded. Then N1 = g(N ′1, . . . , N ′k) with g ∈ {dec, fst, pair, snd, unblind}.
– If g ∈ {dec, fst, snd, unblind}, using the induction hypothesis, we have
(N1φ)↓= g((N ′1φ)↓, . . . , (N ′kφ)↓) and, thus, (Nφ)↓= f((N1φ)↓).
– If g = pair we have a contradiction with the minimality of N .
• If f = dec and N = dec(N1, N2). The case where N1 is a variable is ex-
cluded. ThenN1 = g(N ′1, . . . , N ′k) with g ∈ {dec, fst, penc, renc, snd, unblind,
◦}.
– If g ∈ {dec, fst, snd, unblind}, we conclude thanks to the induction
hypothesis.
– If g = penc, there is a contradiction with the minimality of N .
– Finally, the case when g ∈ {renc, ◦}. We can have a finite (since
depths are finite) sequence of renc(◦(renc(◦(. . . )))) or ◦(renc(◦(. . . ))).
But if there is a reduction with the dec function, then we must have
N1φ =E penc(W1,W2, pk(W3)) with W3 =E N2φ. Moreover, N2
is deducible, then pk(W3) is also deducible and can not contain ai.
Since there is no variable in the frame referring to such a key, it
must come from one (or two in the case of a sequence finishing by
◦) penc(P1, P2, pk(P3)) subterm of N1, a contradiction with the min-
imality of N .
• If f = unblind and N = unblind(N1, N2). The case where N1 is a variable is
excluded. Then N1 = g(N ′1, . . . , N ′k) with g ∈ {blind, dec, fst, snd, unblind}.
– If g ∈ {dec, fst, snd, unblind}, we conclude thanks to the induction
hypothesis.
– If g = blind, there is a contradiction with the minimality of N .
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Definition 13. Let |.| be a measure of the length of a term M such that :
• |u| = 1 for u a constant,
• |f(u1, . . . , un)| =
∑ |ui| for all f ∈ {+, ∗, ◦, }.
• |f(u1, . . . , un)| = 1 +
∑ |ui| otherwise.
We define another measure L which is defined as L(M) = (#(M), |M |) with
#(M) the number of symbols ◦ under renc or penc symbols.
Lemma 14. Let k ≥ 3, Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL be an idk-valid ballot. We suppose that
θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL ≈s θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣR. Then, we have, for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} :
• Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E (M,N,P )θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ with free M , N , P .
• Nθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E pfk1(idk, N1, N2, N3)θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ with free N1, N2, N3.
• Mθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E penc(N2, N1, U)θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ with free U or U = pk(ai +
U ′) with free U ′ and ai ∈ {a1, a2, a3}.
Proof. Let k ∈ {3, . . . , n}. Let Nk such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL is a idk-valid
ballot. Let N ′k minimal in size - according to the measure of length L defined
in Definition 13 - such that :
N ′kθk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL =E Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL (b)
Using Definition 5, we have N ′kθk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL = (N1, N2, N3).
• Let suppose that N ′k is a variable. Since @ x ∈ dom(θk−1) such that
xθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL is a idk-valid ballot, there is a contradiction.
• Thus, N ′k = f(P1, . . . , Pm) with f ∈ {dec, fst, pair, snd, unblind} since only
equations (1), (2), (3) and (7) can lead to (N1, N2, N3).
– If f ∈ {dec, fst, snd, unblind}, using Lemma 12, we have a contradic-
tion with the fact that head(N ′kθk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL) = pair.
– If f = pair, then N ′k = (M,N,P ), with some free M , N , P . Thus we
have :
N ′kθk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL =E (M,N,P )θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL =E Nkθk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL.
Since (Nk =E (M,N,P ))θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL and φk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL ≈s φk−1σk−1N˜
ΣR, we have (Nk =E (M,N,P ))θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣR. Thus, for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR},
we have :
Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E (M,N,P )θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ.
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Moreover, Definition 5 gives us now that Nθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL =E pfk1(idk, P1, P2,
P3).
• N cannot be a variable since there is no x ∈ dom(θk−1) such that xθk−1σk−1N˜
ΣL = pfk1(idk, P1, P2, P3).
• Thus, N = f(N1, . . . , Np) with f ∈ {dec, fst, pfk1, snd, unblind} since only
equations (1), (2), (3) and (7) can lead to pfk1(idk, P1, P2, P3).
– If f ∈ {dec, fst, snd, unblind}, using Lemma 12, we have a contradic-
tion with the fact that head(Nθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL) = pfk1.
– If f = pfk1, then N = pfk1(id3, N1, N2, N3), with some free N1, N2,
N3. Since (N =E pfk1(id3, N1, N2, N3))θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL and φk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL
≈s φk−1σk−1N˜ ΣR, we have (N =E pfk1(id3, N1, N2, N3))θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣR.
Thus, for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR}, we have :
Nθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E pfk1(id3, N1, N2, N3)θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ.
Finally, Definition 5 gives us that Mθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL =E penc(N2θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL,
N1θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL, U) for some term U .
• If M is a variable, then M ∈ {e1, e2}. In that case, we would have
N1θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL =E r1 (or r2) with free N1 which would mean that r1
(or r2) is deducible which is in contradiction with Lemma 11.
• Thus, M = f(N1, . . . , Np) with f ∈ {dec, fst, penc, renc, snd, unblind, ◦}
since only equations (1) to (3) and (5) to (7) can lead to penc(P1, P2, P3).
– If f ∈ {dec, fst, snd, unblind}, using Lemma 12, we have a contradic-
tion with the fact that head(Mθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL) = penc.
– If f = renc i.e. M = renc(M1,M2). The case where M1 is a vari-
able is excluded thanks to the fact that ri is not deducible. Then
M1 = g(M
′
1, . . . ,M
′
p) with g ∈ {dec, fst, penc, renc, unblind, ◦} since
head(M1θk−1 σk−1N˜ ΣL) = penc.
∗ If g ∈ {dec, fst, snd, unblind}, using Lemma 12, we have a contra-
diction with the fact that head(M1θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL) = penc.
∗ If g = renc and M1 = renc(M ′1,M ′2), we have a contradiction
with the minimality of M since renc(M ′1,M ′2 +M2) is a smaller
recipe than renc(renc(M ′1,M ′2),M2).
∗ If g = ◦ andM1 = M ′1◦M ′2, we also have a contradiction with the
minimality of M since renc(M ′1,M2) ◦ renc(M ′2,M2) is a smaller
recipe according to the Definition 13 of the measure L.
∗ If g = penc and M1 = penc(M ′1,M ′2,M ′3). We have two cases :
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· If M ′3 is a variable, then M ′3 ∈ {g1, g2, g3} and we have M =
renc(penc(M ′1,M
′
2, gi),M2) with free M ′1, M ′2 and M2. In
that case, we have :
Mθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL =E renc(penc(M
′
1,M
′
2, gi),M2)θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL (d)
=E penc(M
′
1,M
′
2, pk(ai +M2))θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL
Thanks to the fact that φk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL ≈s φk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣR and
(d), we also have that :
Mθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣR =E renc(penc(M
′
1,M
′
2, gi),M2)θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣR
=E penc(M
′
1,M
′
2, pk(ai +M2))θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣR
Then, we have, for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} :
Mθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E penc(M
′
1,M
′
2, pk(ai +M2))θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ.
Moreover, sinceMθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL =E penc(N2θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL, N1
θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL, U) we have thatM
′
1θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL =E N2θk−1σk−1N˜
ΣL and M ′2θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL =E N1θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL. Using the fact
that φk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL ≈s φk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣR, these equalities hold with
ΣR. Finally, we have, for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} :
Mθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E penc(N2, N1, pk(ai +M2))θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ.
· If M ′3 = h(M ′′1 , . . . ,M ′′q ) with h ∈ {dec, fst, pk, snd, unblind},
we can conclude easily with a contradiction when h 6= pk ac-
cording to Lemma 12. If h = pk then we have a contradiction
with the minimality of M since penc(M ′1,M ′2, pk(M ′′1 +M2))
is smaller than renc(penc(M ′′1 ,M ′′2 , pk(M ′′3 )),M2).
– If f = penc i.e. M = penc(M1,M2,M3) with free M1, M2, M3, we
immediately conclude that, for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} :
Mθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E penc(M1,M2,M3)θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ.
Using the fact thatM1θk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E N2θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ andM2θk−1σk−1N˜
Σ =E N1θk−1σk−1N˜ Σ, we have, with free M3 and Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} :
Mθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E penc(N2, N1,M3)θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ.
– If f = ◦ i.e. M = M1 ◦ M2. The case where M1 or M2 is a
variable is excluded thanks to the fact that ri is not deducible.
Then M1 = h1(M ′1, . . . ,M ′p) and M2 = h2(M ′′1 , . . . ,M ′′q ) with hi ∈
{dec, fst, penc, renc, unblind, ◦} since head(Miθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL) = penc
for i = 1, 2.
∗ If ∃ i such that hi ∈ {dec, fst, snd, unblind}, we have a contradic-
tion using Lemma 12.
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∗ If h1, h2 = penc, we have M1 = penc(M ′1,M ′2,K) and M2 =
penc(M ′′1 , M
′′
2 ,K
′) with K and K ′ such that Kθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL =E
K ′θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL which is in contradiction with the minimality of
M since penc(M ′1  M ′′1 ,M ′2 ∗ M ′′2 ,K) is a smaller recipe than
penc(M ′1,M
′
2,K) ◦ penc(M ′′1 , M ′′2 ,K ′).
∗ If h1 ∈ {renc, ◦} and h2 ∈ {penc, renc, ◦}. If h1 = renc and M1 =
renc(M ′1,M
′
2), we can apply the same discussion on h1 we did on
f when f = renc in a previous case. According to this, the only
possible case is when M ′1 = penc(M ′′1 ,M ′′2 ,M ′′3 ). If g1 = ◦ and
M1 = M
′
1 ◦M ′2, we have an iteration of the current subcase. But
these iterations must stop since M is not of an unlimited length
and, thanks to the contradiction of minimality in some cases, the
remaining global case is when M = ◦ni=1renc(Pi, Qi) ◦M ′ with
M ′ a null term or penc(M ′1,M ′2,M ′3) and Pi = penc(M i1,M i2,M i3)
with M i3 variable, using the discussion on renc case.
Suppose that M ′ = penc(M ′1,M ′2,M ′3), then M ′3θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL is
deducible. In order for M to be reduced, we must have the same
keys in both M ′ and ◦ni=1renc(Pi, Qi). But since M i3 is a vari-
able, M i3 ∈ {g1, g2, g3}, the resulting key of re-encryption is not
deducible, according to Lemma 11. Indeed, the resulting key is
like pk(α1a1 + α2a2 + α3a3 + U) with some integers αi and a
deducible term U (we using the notation that ai + ai = 2ai) and
since there are no variable leading to such a key, we must have
M ′3 = pk(α1a1 + α2a2 + α3a3 + U) which is not possible. Then,
we must have M ′ = .
Thus, we haveM = ◦ni=1renc(Pi, Qi) with Pi = penc(M i1,M i2,M i3)
and M i3 variable. Suppose that ∃ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n such that M i3 6=
M j3 , let us take, for example, M
i
3 = g1 and M
j
3 = g2. Then, we
should have a1 + qi = a2 + qj which implies that qj = a1 + zj et
then that a2 + U is deducible which is in contradiction with
11. Moreover, in order to have a reduction, all Qi must be
equal. Then we take, the minimal one, Q1 and, we have :
M = ◦ni=1renc(penc(M i1,M i2, x), Q1) with x ∈ {g1, g2, g3} and
free M i1, M i2, Q1.
Then, we have :
Mθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL= ◦ni=1renc(penc(M i1,M i2, x), Qi)θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL (dd)
=E penc(ni=1M i1, ∗ni=1M i2, pk(aj +Q1))θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL
Thanks to the fact that φk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL ≈s φk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣR and (dd),
we also have that :
Mθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣR= ◦ni=1renc(penc(M i1,M i2, x), Qi)θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣR
=E penc(ni=1M i1, ∗ni=1M i2, pk(aj +Q1))θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣR.
Then, we have, for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} :
Mθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E penc(M
′
1,M
′
2, pk(ai +M
′
3))θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ.
Moreover, sinceMθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL =E penc(N2θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL, N1θk−1
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σk−1
N˜
ΣL, U) we have that M ′1θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL =E N2θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL
and M ′2θk−1 σ
k−1
N˜
ΣL =E N1θk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL. Using the fact that
φk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL ≈s φk−1σ
k−1
N˜
ΣR, these equalities hold with ΣR.
Finally, we have, for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} :
Mθk−1σk−1N˜ Σ =E penc(N2, N1, pk(ai +M
′
3))θk−1σ
k−1
N˜
Σ.
Lemma 15. Let ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two frames such that ϕ1 ≈s ϕ2. Let a a name
such that a ∈ bn(ϕ1) ∩ bn(ϕ2) and p(a) is not deducible. Let Ui = d(p(a), U ′′i )
in normal form for i = 1, 2 such that Ui does not appear in ϕi. Then, we have,
for x /∈ dom(ϕ1) ∪ dom(ϕ2) :
ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} ≈s ϕ2 ∪ {U2/x}.
Proof. Let n1 be a fresh name and δ : U1 7→ n1 the function which replace any
occurrence of U1 by n1. Let us prove that :
ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} ≈s ν.n1(ϕ1 ∪ {n1/x}).
Let ϕ′1 = ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} and ϕ′′1 = ν.n1(ϕ1 ∪ {n1/x}). Let M and N terms
such that (M = N)ϕ′′1 . Then, we have, with ϕ′′1 = νn˜.σ′′1 , (Mσ′′1 )[n1 7→ U1] =E
(Nσ′′1 )[n1 7→ U1] since the equationnal theory is stable by names substitutions.
Now, since n1 /∈ fn(M) ∪ fn(N), we have M(σ′′1 [n1 7→ U1]) =E N(σ′′1 [n1 7→ U1])
but σ′′1 [n1 7→ U1] = σ′1 with ϕ′1 = νm˜.σ′1. So we have (M = N)ϕ′1 too.
Now let M and N terms such that (M = N)ϕ′1. Then we have :
(Mσ′1)↓ =AC (Nσ′1)↓
Thus,
(Mσ′1)↓ δ =AC (Nσ′1)↓ δ
Claim 1: If U −→ V then Uδ −→ V δ.
Proof. (Claim 1) Let U be a term. Since U −→ V , there exists a rule l −→ r,
a substitution θ and a position p such that U |p = lθ and V = U [rθ]p. Then
∀ p′ such that U |p′ = U1, we have that p′ cannot be a suffix of p, since U1
is in normal form. Let U ′ = U [X]p, then Uδ = U ′δ[(lθ)δ]p. Since l does not
contain d, we have that U ′δ[lθδ]p = U ′δ[l(θδ)]. Using the rewriting rule, we
have U ′δ[l(θδ)] −→ U ′δ[r(θδ)]p. Finally, U ′δ[r(θδ)]p = (U ′[rθ]p)δ = V δ, that is
Uδ −→ V δ.
Let us prove that (Mσ′1) ↓ δ =E (Mσ′1δ) ↓. If Mσ′1 is in normal form,
we have that (Mσ′1δ)↓=E (Mσ′1)↓ δ. If it is not, then, it exists W1, . . . ,Wn
such that W1 = Mσ′1, Wn = (Mσ′1)↓ and Wi −→ Wi+1 for i = 1..n − 1.
Using Claim 1, we have that Wiδ −→ Wi+1δ for i = 1..n − 1 and then that
((Mσ′1)δ)↓=AC (Mσ′1)↓ δ. Thus, using the same argument for Nσ′1, we have :
Mσ′1δ =E Nσ
′
1δ
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Since a, which is a restricted name, M and N cannot contain a. Moreover,
p(a) is not deducible, thus we cannot have the case where M = d(x, y) with
xσ′1δ = p(a). Then, we have :
M(σ′1δ) =E N(σ
′
1δ)
Since U1 does not appear in ϕi, we have :
Mσ′′1 =E Nσ
′′
1
And we have (M = N)ϕ′′1 , which proves the static equivalence above. Then,
using the same development on ϕ2 we have, for i = 1, 2 and two fresh names
n1, n2 :
ϕi ∪ {Ui/x} ≈s ν.ni(ϕi ∪ {ni/x}).
Since ϕ1 ≈s ϕ2, we have that ν.n1(ϕ1 ∪{n1/x}) ≈s ν.n2(ϕ2 ∪{n2/x}) and using
what we just proved, we get :
ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} ≈s ϕ2 ∪ {U2/x}.
Lemma 16. Let ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two frames such that ϕ1 ≈s ϕ2. Let a a name
such that a ∈ bn(ϕ1) ∩ bn(ϕ2) and is not deducible. Let Ui = sign(U ′i , a) in
normal form for i = 1, 2 and Ui do not appear in ϕi. Then, we have, for
x /∈ dom(ϕ1) ∪ dom(ϕ2) :
ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} ≈s ϕ2 ∪ {U2/x}.
Proof. Let n1 be a fresh name and δ : U ′1 7→ n1 the function which replace any
occurrence of U ′1 by n1. Let us prove that :
ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} ≈s ν.n1(ϕ1 ∪ {sign(n1,a)/x}).
Let ϕ′1 = ϕ1∪{U1/x} and ϕ′′1 = ν.n1(ϕ1∪{sign(n1,a)/x}). LetM and N terms
such that (M = N)ϕ′′1 . Then, we have, with ϕ′′1 = νn˜.σ′′1 , (Mσ′′1 )[sign(n1, a) 7→
U1] =E (Nσ
′′
1 )[sign(n1, a) 7→ U1] since the equationnal theory is stable by names
substitutions. Now, since n1 /∈ fn(M) ∪ fn(N), we have M(σ′′1 [sign(n1, a) 7→
U1]) =E N(σ
′′
1 [sign(n1, a) 7→ U1]) but σ′′1 [sign(n1, a) 7→ U1] = σ′1 with ϕ′1 =
νm˜.σ′1. So we have (M = N)ϕ′1 too.
Now let M and N terms such that (M = N)ϕ′1. Then we have :
(Mσ′1)↓ =AC (Nσ′1)↓
(Mσ′1)↓ δ =AC (Nσ′1)↓ δ
Claim 2: If U −→ V then Uδ −→ V δ.
Proof. (Claim 2) Let U be a term. Since U −→ V , ∃ a rule l −→ r, a substitution
θ and a position p such that U |p = lθ and V = U [rθ]p. Then, ∀ p′ such that
U |p′ = U1, we have that p′ cannot be a suffix of p, since U1 is in normal form.
Let U ′ = U [X]p, then Uδ = U ′δ[lθδ]p. Using the equational theory, the only
interesting case is when lθ −→ rθ is equation checksign(M, vk(id), sign(M, id)) =
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Ok where M = U ′1 and id = a. Then, we can easily see that lθδ −→ rθδ
since lθδ = checksign(n1, a, sign(n1, a)) and rθ = rθδ. In other cases, we have
lθδ −→ rθδ since modification implies by δ do not interfere. Thus, we have
U ′δ[lθδ] −→ U ′δ[r(θδ)]p. Finally, U ′δ[rθδ]p = (U ′[rθ]p)δ = V δ, that is Uδ −→
V δ.
Let us prove that (Mσ′1) ↓ δ =E (Mσ′1δ) ↓. If Mσ′1 is in normal form,
we have that (Mσ′1δ)↓=E (Mσ′1)↓ δ. If it is not, then, it exists W1, . . . ,Wn
such that W1 = Mσ′1, Wn = (Mσ′1)↓ and Wi −→ Wi+1 for i = 1..n − 1.
Using Claim 2, we have that Wiδ −→ Wi+1δ for i = 1..n − 1 and then that
((Mσ′1)δ)↓=AC (Mσ′1)↓ δ. Thus, using the same argument for Nσ′1, we have :
Mσ′1δ =E Nσ
′
1δ
Since a, which is a restricted name, M and N cannot contain a. Then, we have
:
M(σ′1δ) =E N(σ
′
1δ)
Since U1 does not appear in ϕi, we have :
Mσ′′1 =E Nσ
′′
1
And we have (M = N)ϕ′′1 , which proves the static equivalence above. Then,
using the same development on ϕ2 we have, for i = 1, 2 and two fresh names
n1, n2 :
ϕi ∪ {Ui/x} ≈s ν.ni(ϕi ∪ {sign(ni,a)/x}).
Since ϕ1 ≈s ϕ2, we have that ν.n1(ϕ1∪{sign(n1,a)/x}) ≈s ν.n2(ϕ2∪{sign(n2,a)/x})
and using what we just proved, we get :
ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} ≈s ϕ2 ∪ {U2/x}.
Lemma 17. Let φ and ψ be frames such that φ∪ {t/x} ≈s ψ ∪ {t′/x} for some
terms t and t′. Then :
φ ∪ {t/x} ∪ {t/y} ≈s ψ ∪ {t′/x} ∪ {t′/y}.
Proof. Let φ ∪ {t/x} ∪ {t/y} = φ′′, ψ ∪ {t′/x} ∪ {t′/y} = ψ′′, φ ∪ {t/x} = φ′
and ψ ∪ {t′/x} = ψ′. Let M , N be terms such that (M = N)φ′′. If y /∈
fv(M)∪ fv(N) then since φ′ ≈s ψ′, the fact that (M = N)ψ′′ is straightforward.
If y ∈ fv(M)∪ fv(N), let δ : y 7→ x, we have : (Pδ)φ′ = Pφ′′ and (Pδ)ψ′ = Pψ′′
for all term P . Thus :
Mφ′′ =E Nφ′′
(Mδ)φ′ =E (Nδ)φ′
Since φ′ ≈s ψ′ and ((Mδ) = (Nδ))φ′, we have :
(Mδ)ψ′ =E (Nδ)ψ′
Mψ′′ =E Nψ′′
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Lemma 18. Let ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two frames such that ϕ1 ≈s ϕ2. Let a a name
such that a ∈ bn(ϕ1) ∩ bn(ϕ2) and is not deducible. Let Ui = dec(U ′i , a) in
normal form for i = 1, 2 and Ui do not appear in ϕi. Then, we have, for
x /∈ dom(ϕ1) ∪ dom(ϕ2) :
ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} ≈s ϕ2 ∪ {U2/x}.
Proof. Let n1 be a fresh name and δ : U1 7→ n1 the function which replace any
occurrence of U1 by n1. Let us prove that :
ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} ≈s ν.n1(ϕ1 ∪ {n1/x}).
Let ϕ′1 = ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} and ϕ′′1 = ν.n1(ϕ1 ∪ {n1/x}). Let M and N terms
such that (M = N)ϕ′′1 . Then, we have, with ϕ′′1 = νn˜.σ′′1 , (Mσ′′1 )[n1 7→ U1] =E
(Nσ′′1 )[n1 7→ U1] since the equationnal theory is stable by names substitutions.
Now, since n1 /∈ fn(M) ∪ fn(N), we have M(σ′′1 [n1 7→ U1]) =E N(σ′′1 [n1 7→ U1])
but σ′′1 [n1 7→ U1] = σ′1 with ϕ′1 = νm˜.σ′1. So we have (M = N)ϕ′1 too.
Now let M and N terms such that (M = N)ϕ′1. Then we have :
(Mσ′1)↓ =AC (Nσ′1)↓
Thus,
(Mσ′1)↓ δ =AC (Nσ′1)↓ δ
Claim 3: If U −→ V then Uδ −→ V δ.
Proof. (Claim 3) Let U be a term. Since U −→ V , there exists a rule l −→ r,
a substitution θ and a position p such that U |p = lθ and V = U [rθ]p. Then
∀ p′ such that U |p′ = U1, we have that p′ cannot be a suffix of p, since U1
is in normal form. Let U ′ = U [X]p, then Uδ = U ′δ[(lθ)δ]p. Since l does not
contain dec, we have that U ′δ[lθδ]p = U ′δ[l(θδ)]. Using the rewriting rule, we
have U ′δ[l(θδ)] −→ U ′δ[r(θδ)]p. Finally, U ′δ[r(θδ)]p = (U ′[rθ]p)δ = V δ, that is
Uδ −→ V δ.
Let us prove that (Mσ′1)↓ δ =E (Mσ′1δ)↓. IfMσ′1 is in normal form, we have
that (Mσ′1δ)↓=E (Mσ′1)↓ δ. If it is not, then, it exists U1, . . . , Un such that
U1 = Mσ
′
1, Un = (Mσ′1)↓ and Ui −→ Ui+1 for i = 1..n− 1. Using Claim 1, we
have that Uiδ −→ Ui+1δ for i = 1..n−1 and then that ((Mσ′1)δ)↓=AC (Mσ′1)↓ δ.
Thus, using the same argument for Nσ′1, we have :
Mσ′1δ =E Nσ
′
1δ
Since a, which is a restricted name, M and N cannot contain a. Then, we have
:
M(σ′1δ) =E N(σ
′
1δ)
Since U1 does not appear in ϕi, we have :
Mσ′′1 =E Nσ
′′
1
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And we have (M = N)ϕ′′1 , which proves the static equivalence above. Then,
using the same development on ϕ2 we have, for i = 1, 2 and two fresh names
n1, n2 :
ϕi ∪ {Ui/x} ≈s ν.ni(ϕi ∪ {ni/x}).
Since ϕ1 ≈s ϕ2, we have that ν.n1(ϕ1 ∪{n1/x}) ≈s ν.n2(ϕ2 ∪{n2/x}) and using
what we just proved, we get :
ϕ1 ∪ {U1/x} ≈s ϕ2 ∪ {U2/x}.
Lemma 19. Let Niθi−1σi−1N˜ Σ be idi-valid ballots for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} and i =
3..n. Let φresi−1 = νn˜.θresi−1. We have :
φresi−1σN˜ΣL ≈s φresi−1σN˜ΣR =⇒ φresi σN˜ΣL ≈s φresi σN˜ΣR.
Proof. As a first remark : for i = 3..n, since Niθi−1σi−1N˜ Σ is a idi-valid ballot,
then we know that, using Lemma 14 :
• NiθnσN˜Σ =E (Wi, Xi, Zi)θnσN˜Σ with freeWi, Wi, Zi and Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR}.
• WiθnσN˜Σ =E penc(W
′
i ,W
′′
i , Ui)θnσN˜Σ with Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR}, free W ′i , W ′′i
and free Ui or Ui = pk(ai + U ′i) with free U ′i and ai ∈ {a1, a2, a3}.
Then, we have two cases :
• UiθnσN˜Σ =E pk(a1). Then, we have :
result iθ
res
i σN˜Σ =E dec(penc(W
′
iθ
res
i−1σN˜Σ,W
′′
i θ
res
i−1σN˜Σ, pk(a1)), a1)
=E W
′
iθ
res
i−1σN˜Σ.
Then, we have result iθresi σN˜Σ =E Wθ
res
i−1σN˜Σ where W is free. Let
θ′ = θresi−1σN˜ and θ = θ
′ ∪ {Mθ′/resulti} = θresi σN˜ . Using Lemma 9, since
φresi−1σN˜ΣL ≈s φresi−1σN˜ΣR, we conclude.
• UθnσN˜Σ 6=E pk(a1). Then, result iθresi σN˜Σ =E dec(penc(W ′i ,W ′′i , Ui)θresi−1
σi−1
N˜
Σ, a1). Then, we have two cases. The first one when ∃ j such that
resultjθ
res
i σN˜Σ =E result iθ
res
i σN˜ . In that case, we use Lemma 17 to
conclude. The second one when the first case do not happen is solved
using directly Lemma 18 since a1 is restricted and not deducible.
Lemma 20. Let NiθiσN˜Σ be idi-valid ballots for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} and i = 3..n.
result1σN˜ΣL =E v1 =E result1σN˜ΣR
result2σN˜ΣL =E v2 =E result2σN˜ΣR.
Proof. Obvious.
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Now let us return to Proposition 8 and start to prove it.
Proposition 8. Let NiθiΣ be idi-valid ballots for Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} and i ∈
{3, . . . , n}, we have :
νn˜.(θ|R)σN˜ΣL ≈s νn˜.(θ|R)σN˜ΣR.
Proof. The proposition will be proved using two consecutive induction.
First, let us show that : for any i ≥ 2, let φi = νn˜.θi then φiσiN˜ΣL ≈s
φiσ
i
N˜
ΣR.
Base Case : Using Lemma 10, we show that φ2σ2N˜ΣL ≈s φ2σ2N˜ΣR.
Induction step : Assume now that φiσiN˜ΣL ≈s φiσiN˜ΣR and let us show
that φi+1σi+1N˜ ΣL ≈s φi+1σ
i+1
N˜
ΣR.
Using Lemma 15 with U1 = (yiθiσiN˜ΣL)↓= d(p(idi), U ′1) and U2 = (yiθiσiN˜ΣR)↓
= d(p(idi), U
′
2), we prove that θi ∪ {U1/yi}σi+1N˜ ΣL ≈s θi ∪ {U2/yi}σ
i+1
N˜
ΣR.
Then, using this new equivalence and Lemma 16 with U1 = (ziθiσi+1N˜ ΣL)↓=
sign(U ′1, idR) and U2 = (ziθiσ
i+1
N˜
ΣL)↓= sign(U ′2, idR), we have now that φi+1σi+1N˜
ΣL ≈s φi+1σi+1N˜ ΣR.
Thus, we deduct :
φnσN˜ΣL ≈s φnσN˜ΣR
and we can note φn = φres2 .
Now let us show that : for any i ≥ 2, φresi = νn˜.θresi then φresi σN˜ΣL ≈s
φresi σN˜ΣR.
Base Case : Using the fact that φn = φres2 , the base case is proved by the
first induction.
Induction step : Assume now that φresi σN˜ΣL ≈s φresi σN˜ΣR and let us
show that φresi+1σN˜ΣL ≈s φresi+1σN˜ΣR.
Using Lemma 19, we can prove the induction step adding each result one by
one and, finally, we have :
φσN˜ΣL ≈s φσN˜ΣR with φ = νn˜.θ.
Now using Lemmas 9 and 20, we prove the final static equivalence :
φ1 = νn˜.(θ|R)σN˜ΣL ≈s φ2 = νn˜.(θ|R)σN˜ΣR.
From Proposition 8, we can enunciate a corollary.
Corollary 21. For i = 0 . . . n, j = 3 . . . n, and NkθkΣ be idk-valid ballots for
Σ ∈ {ΣL,ΣR} and k = 3 . . . n, we have :
νn˜.θiσ
i
N˜
ΣL ≈s νn˜.θiσiN˜ΣR
νn˜.θ′jσN˜ΣL ≈s νn˜.θ′jσN˜ΣR
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B Proof of Theorem 4
Let us remind the Theorem we need to prove.
Theorem 4. Let n be the number of voters. The Norwegian e-voting protocol
process specification satisfies ballot secrecy without the auditing process, even
with n− 2 voters are corrupted, provided that the other components are honest.
A′n[V {c1/cauth ,cRV1 /cRV }σ | V {c2/cauth ,cRV2 /cRV }τ ]
≈l A′n [V {c1/cauth ,cRV1 /cRV }τ |V {c2/cauth ,cRV2 /cRV }σ]
where σ = {v1/xvote} and τ = {v2/xvote}.
Let us introduce the relation we will use to prove labeled bisimilarity.
B.1 Partial evolutions of protocol specification
First, we will introduce partial evolutions of the protocol process specification
and remind some notations used. Note that correct modeling of sub-processes
have not been depicted but one can see that describing partial evolutions of
sub-processes can be seen as a modeling description. Then, as an example, Bn,
the ballot box correspond to B11,n in that case, without auditor. It avoids a
annoying and non-useful applied-pi description, since it is easy to remove all
lines dealing with an auditor’s stuff, as the full description was depicted in the
article.
Definition 22. Notations and partial evolutions for honest voters. (i ∈ {1, 2})
V 1i = cout〈balli〉.V 2i ei = penc(xivote, ti, pk(a1))
V 2i = ci〈balli〉.V 3i pfk i = pfk1(idi, ti, xivote, ei)
V 3i = cRVi(reci).V
4
i sigi = sign((ei, pfk i), idi)
V 4i = ci(coni).V
5
i balli = (ei, pfk i, sigi)
V 5i = cout〈coni〉.V 6i hvi = hash((vk(idi), ei, pfk i, sigi))
V 6i = cout〈reci〉.V 7i
V 7i = if φv(idpR, idi, hvi, coni, xvotei , reci) then V 8i else 0
V 8i = ci〈Ok〉
Definition 23. Notations and partial evolutions for the ballot box. (i ∈ {1, . . . , n})
B1i,n = ci(xi).B
1.1
i,n e
′
i = renc(Π1(xi), s(idi))
B1.1i,n = if φb(idpi, xi) then B1.2i,n else 0 pfk
′
i = pfk2(idi, a2,Π1(xi), e
′
i)
B1.2i,n = cBR〈ball′i〉.B2i,n e′′i = blind(e′i, s(idi))
B2i,n = cBR(qi).B
3
i,n pfk
′′
i = pfk2(idi, s(idi), e
′
i, e
′′
i )
B3i,n = if φs(idpR, hbbi, qi) then B3.1i,n else 0 ball′i = (xi, e′i, pfk
′
i, e
′′
i , pfk
′′
i )
B3.1i,n = ci〈qi〉.B3.2i,n hbbi = hash((vk(idi), xi))
B3.2i,n = ci(syi).B
1
i+1,n
B3.2n,n = cn(syn).B
4
1,n
B4i,n = cBD〈Π1(xi)〉.B4i+1,n
B4n,n = cBD〈Π1(xn)〉
Definition 24. Notations et and partial evolutions for the receipt generator.
(i ∈ {1, . . . , n})
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R1i,n = cBR(pi).R
2
i,n
R2i,n = if φr(idpi, pi) then R3i,n else 0
R3i,n = cRVi〈ri〉.R4i,n ri = d(p(idi), dec(Π6(pi), a3))
R4i,n = cBR〈sigRi 〉.R1i+1,n hbri = hash((idpi,Π1(pi),Π2(pi),Π3(pi)))
R4n,n= cBR〈sigRn 〉 sigRi = sign(hbri, idR)
Definition 25. Notations and partial evolutions for the decryption service, we
distinguish two cases : one without a swap (D) and one with swap (D).(i ∈
{1, . . . , n})
deci = dec(di, a1) D
1
i,n = cBD(dj).D
1
i+1,n
D
1
n,n = cBD(dn).D
2
1
D1i,n = cBD(di).D
1
i+1,n D
2
1,n = cout〈dec2〉.D
2
2,n
D1n,n= cBD(dn).D
2
1,n D
2
2,n = cout〈dec1〉.D
2
3,n
D2i,n = cout〈deci〉.D2i+1,n D
2
i,n = cout〈deci〉.D
2
i+1,n
D2n,n= cout〈decn〉 D
2
n,n = cout〈decn〉
Definition 26. Partial evolutions of global process representing the enrichment
of the frame as the process advances.
n˜ = (a1, a2, id1, id2, idR, c1, c2, cRV1 , cRV2 , cBR, cBD)
Γ = {pk(a1)/g1 ,pk(a2) /g2 ,pk(a3) /g3 ,vk(id1) /idp1 , . . . ,vk(idn) /idpn ,vk(idR) /idpR}
A0 = νn˜. [_|Γ]
A1 = ν(n˜, t1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|Γ
]
A2 = ν(n˜, t1, x1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|{ball1/x1}|Γ
]
A3 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|{ball1/x1}|{ball
′
1/p1}|Γ
]
A4 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|{ball1/x1}|{ball
′
1/p1}|{r1/rec1}|Γ
]
A5 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|{ball1/x1}|{ball
′
1/p1}|{r1/rec1}|
{sigR1 /q1}|Γ
]
A6 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|{ball1/x1}|{ball
′
1/p1}|{r1/rec1}|
{sigR1 /q1}|{q1/con1}|Γ
]
A7 = A6 [_|{rec1/y1}]
A8 = A7 [_|{con1/z1}]
A9 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|i = 1, 2}|{ball1/x1}|
{ball′1/p1}|{r1/rec1}|{sig
R
1 /q1}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ
]
A10 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2, x2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|{balli/xi}|i = 1, 2}|
{ball′1/p1}|{r1/rec1}|{sig
R
1 /q1}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ
]
A11 =ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2, x2, p2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|{balli/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi}
|i = 1, 2}|{r1/rec1}|{sig
R
1 /q1}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ
]
A12 =ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2, x2, p2, rec2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|{balli/xi}|
{ball′i/pi |{ri/reci}}|i = 1, 2}|{sig
R
1 /q1}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ
]
A13 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2, x2, p2, rec2, q2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|{balli/xi}|
{ball′i/pi |{ri/reci}|{sig
R
i /qi}}|i = 1, 2}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ
]
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A14 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2, x2, p2, rec2, q2, con2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|
{balli/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi |{ri/reci}|{sig
R
i /qi}|{q1/con1}}|i = 1, 2}|
{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ]
A15 =A14 [_|{rec2/y2}]
For i ∈ {3, . . . , n} :
m˜i = {(pk, qk)|k ∈ {3, . . . , i− 1}}
Λ = {{balli/bi}|{balli/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi |{ri/reci}|{sig
R
i /qi}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1 |
{con1/z1}}|i = 1, 2}
Λi = {{Nk/xk}|{ball
′
k/pk}|{rk/yk}|{sig
R
k /qk}|{qk/zk}|{Wk/syk}|
k ∈ {3, . . . , i− 1}}
A1i = ν(n˜, m˜i). [_|Λi|Λ|Γ]
A2i = A
1
i
[
_|{Ni/xi}
]
A3i = ν(n˜, m˜i, pi).
[
_|{Ni/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi}|Λi|Λ|Γ
]
A4i = A
3
i [_|{ri/yi}]
A5i = ν(n˜, m˜i+1).
[
_|{Ni/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi}|{ri/yi}|{sig
R
i /qi}|Λi|Λ|Γ
]
A6i = ν(n˜, m˜i+1).
[
_|{Ni/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi}|{ri/yi}|{sig
R
i /qi}|{qi/zi}|Λi|Λ|Γ
]
For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
d˜i = {dk|k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}}
Ωi = {{Π1(xk)/dk}|k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}}
A′i = ν(n˜, m˜n+1, d˜i). [_|Ωi|Λn+1|Λ|Γ]
A′′1 = A
′
n
[
_|{dec1/result1}
]
A′′i = A
′′
i−1
[
_|{deci/resulti}
]
A
′′
1 = A
′
n
[
_|{{dec2/result1}
]
A
′′
2 = A
′′
1
[
_|{{dec1/result2}
]
A
′′
i = A
′′
i−1
[
_|{deci/resulti}
]
B.2 Relation
Now we can define the relation.
Definition 27. Given integer n ≥ 2, ∀ 3 ≤ j ≤ n, let Mj and Nj terms
such that Njθj−1σ
j−1
N˜
ΣL is an idj-valid ballot, and such that fv(Mj)∪ fv(Nj) ⊆
dom(A1j ) and (fn(Mj)∪ fn(Nj))∩bn(A1j ) = ∅. We consider the smallest relation
R which is closed under structural equivalence and includes the following pairs
of extended processes :
A0
[
V 11 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n
] ∼R A0 [V 11 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n] (1)
A1
[
V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A1
[
V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (2)
A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (3)
A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.21,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.21,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (4)
RR n° 7781
42 Cortier & Wiedling
A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R21,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R21,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (5)
A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R31,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R31,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (6)
A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |B21,n|R41,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |B21,n|R41,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (7)
A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B31,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B31,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (8)
A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B3.11,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B3.11,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (9)
A6
[
V 51 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A6
[
V 51 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (10)
A7
[
V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A7
[
V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (11)
A8
[
V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A8
[
V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (12)
A8
[
V 81 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A8
[
V 81 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (13)
A8
[
V 12 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ ∼R A8
[
V 12 |B12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ (14)
A9
[
V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A9
[
V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (15)
A10
[
V 32 |B1.12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A10
[
V 32 |B1.12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (16)
A10
[
V 32 |B1.22,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A10
[
V 32 |B1.22,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (17)
A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R22,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R22,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (18)
A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R32,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R32,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (19)
A12
[
V 42 |B22,n|R42,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A12
[
V 42 |B22,n|R42,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (20)
A13
[
V 42 |B32,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A13
[
V 42 |B32,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (21)
A13
[
V 42 |B3.12,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A13
[
V 42 |B3.12,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (22)
A14
[
V 52 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A14
[
V 52 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (23)
A15
[
V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A15
[
V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (24)
A13
[
V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A13
[
V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (25)
A13
[
V 82 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A13
[
V 82 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (26)
(i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, R1n+1,n = 0)
A1i
[
B1i,n|R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A1i
[
B1i,n|R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (27)
A1i
[
B1.1i,n{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A1i
[
B1.1i,n{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (28)
A2i
[
B1.2i,n |R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A2i
[
B1.2i,n |R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (29)
A3i
[
B2i,n|R2i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A3i
[
B2i,n|R2i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (30)
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A3i
[
B2i,n|R3i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A3i
[
B2i,n|R3i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (31)
A4i
[
B2i,n|R4i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A4i
[
B2i,n|R4i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (32)
A5i
[
B3i,n|R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A5i
[
B3i,n|R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (33)
A5i
[
B3.1i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A5i
[
B3.1i,n |R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (34)
A6i
[
B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL ∼R A6i
[
B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR (35)
(i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {3, . . . , n})
A′i
[
B4i,n|D1i,n
]
ΣL ∼R A′i
[
B4i,n|D
1
i,n
]
ΣR (36)
A′n+1
[
D21,n
]
ΣL ∼R A′n+1
[
D
2
1,n
]
ΣR (37)
A′′1
[
D22,n
]
ΣL ∼R A′′1
[
D
2
2,n
]
ΣR (38)
A′′j−1
[
D2j,n
]
ΣL ∼R A′′j−1
[
D
2
j,n
]
ΣR (39)
A′′n [0] ΣL ∼R A
′′
n [0] ΣR (40)
(i ∈ {3, . . . , n})
A1i
[{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n]ΣL ∼R A1i [{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n]ΣR (41)
B.3 Useful lemmas
Let us introduce useful lemmas which will be used to prove that the constructed
relation satisfies the property of Definition 2.
Definition 5. Let id ∈ {id1, . . . , idn}. A term N is said to be a id - valid ballot
if φb(id,N) = true, equivalently : N = (N1, N2, N3)checksign((N1, N2), vk(id), N3) =E Ok
checkpfk1(vk(id), N1, N2) =E Ok
.
Lemma 28. Let N be a id-valid ballot, thus N = (N1, N2, N3). Let
Nrenc = renc(N1, a2), Nblind = blind(Nrenc, s(id)),
Nhash = hash((vk(id), N1, N2, N3)), N ′ = (N,Nrenc, N1pfk , Nblind, N
2
pfk ).
N1pfk = pfk2(idp, a2, N1, Nrenc), N
2
pfk = pfk2(idp, s(id), Nrenc, Nblind),
Rsign = sign(Nhash, idR)
Then we have φb(idp,N) =E φr(idp,N ′) =E φs(idpR, Nhash, Rsign) =E true
with idp = vk(id).
Proof. Let N be a id-valid ballot. By definition, we have that φb(id,N) = true.
According to the definition of N ′, we have that N ′ = (N ′1, N ′2, N ′3, N ′4, N ′5) with
N ′1 = N = (N1, N2, N3). Moreover, we know that checkpfk1(idp,N1, N2) =E
checksign((N1, N2), idp,N3) =E Ok since φb(idp,N) = true. In addition, we
have :
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checkpfk2(idp,N
′
2, N
′
3) =E checkpfk2(vk(id), Nrenc, N
1
pfk )
=E checkpfk2(vk(id), renc(N1, a2), pfk2(idp, a2, N1, renc(N1, a2)))
=E Ok
and
checkpfk2(idp,N
′
4, N
′
5) =E checkpfk2(vk(id), Nblind, N
2
pfk )
=E checkpfk2(vk(id), Nblind, pfk2(vk(id), s(id), Nrenc, Nblind))
where Nblind = blind(Nrenc, s(id))
=E Ok.
Then, we have φr(idp,N ′) = true. Finally, we have :
checksign(Nhash, idpR, Rsign) =E checksign(Nhash, idpR, sign(Nhash, idR))
=E Ok
which prove that φs(idpR, Nhash, Rsign) = true.
Lemma 29. Let N be a term such that, for some Nrand :
N = (N1, N2, N3)
N1 = penc(v,Nrand, pk(a1))
N2 = pfk1(id,Nrand, v,N1)
N3 = sign((N1, N2), id).
Let Rrec = dec(Nblind, a3), with Nblind, Rsign and Nhash the same as in Lemma
28. Then, N is a id-valid ballot and we have :
φv(idpR, id,Nhash, Rsign, v,Nrec) = true.
Proof. Let N be this term. Then, N clearly satisfies Definition 5, and :
unblind(dec(Nblind, a3), s(id)) =E unblind(dec(blind(Nrenc, s(id)), a3), s(id))
= unblind(dec(blind(renc(N1, a2), s(id)), a3), s(id))
= unblind(dec(blind(renc(penc(v,Nrand, pk(a1)), a2), s(id)), a3), s(id))
(6)
=E unblind(dec(blind(penc(v,Nrand, pk(a1 + a2)), s(id)), a3), s(id))
= unblind(dec(blind(penc(v,Nrand, pk(a3)), s(id)), a3), s(id))
(4)
=E unblind(blind(v, s(id)), s(id)
(7)
=E v.
Moreover :
checksign(Nhash, idpR, Rsign) =E checksign(Nhash, idpR, sign(Nhash, idR))
=E Ok
which prove that φv(idpR, id,Nhash, Rsign, v,Nrec) = true.
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B.4 Proof for the relation
Let us prove that R satisfies the three properties of Definition 2.
Internal Reductions : We must show for all extended processes A and
B, where A R B, that if A −→ A′ for some A′, then B −→ B′ and A′ R B′
for some B′. We observe that if A R B by (1), (10), (11), (14), (23), (24), (27),
(31), (34), (35) or (37) to (40) then there is no extended process A′ such that
A −→ A′. We proceed by case analysis on the remaining cases.
(2) We have
A ≡ A1
[
V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A1
[
V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A1
[
c1〈ball1〉.V 31 |V 12 |c1(x1).B1.11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ
and
A′ ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ.
It follows from
B ≡ A1
[
c1〈ball1〉.V 31 |V 12 |c1(x1).B1.11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
Since
A′ = A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(3) We have
A ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |if φb(idp1, x1) then B1.21,n else 0|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ.
Since x1 refers to ball1, it follows from Lemma 29 applied to ball1σ that it
is a id1-valid ballot and from Lemma 28 that φb(idp1, x1){ball1/x1}σ = true
and
A′ ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.21,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ.
It follows from
B ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |if φb(idp1, x1) then B1.21,n else 0|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
and from Lemma 29 and Lemma 28 applied to ball1τ , since φb(idp1, x1)
{ball1/x1}τ = true, that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.21,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
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Since
A′ ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.21,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(4) We have
A ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.21,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.21,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |cBR〈ball′1〉.B21,n|cBR(p1).R21,n|D11,n
]
σ
and
A′ ≡ A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R21,n|D11,n
]
σ.
It follows from
B ≡ A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |cBR〈ball′1〉.B21,n|cBR(p1).R21,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R21,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
Since
A′ = A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R21,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(5) We have
A ≡ A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R21,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R21,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|if φr(idp1, p1) then R31,n else 0|D11,n
]
σ
and it follows from Lemma 28, since ball1σ is verifying Lemma 29, that
φr(idp1, p1){ball1/x1 , ball
′
1/p1}σ = true, thus
A′ ≡ A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R31,n|D11,n
]
σ.
It follows from
B ≡ A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|if φr(idp1, p1) then R31,n else 0|D
1
1,n
]
τ
and Lemma 28 and Lemma 29 applied to ball1τ that φr(idp1, p1){ball1/x1 ,
ball′1/p1}τ = true thus B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R31,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
Since
A′ = A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R31,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
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(6) We have
A ≡ A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R31,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R31,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A3
[
cRV1(rec1).V
4
1 |V 12 |B21,n|cRV1〈r1〉.R41,n|D11,n
]
σ
and
A′ ≡ A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |B21,n|R41,n|D11,n
]
σ.
It follows from
B ≡ A3
[
cRV1(rec1).V
4
1 |V 12 |B21,n|cRV1〈r1〉.R41,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |B21,n|R41,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
. Since
A′ = A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |B21,n|R41,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′
, we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(7) We have
A ≡ A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |B21,n|R41,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |B21,n|R41,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |cBR(q1).B31,n|cBR〈sigR1 〉.R12,n|D11,n
]
σ
and
A′ ≡ A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B31,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ.
It follows from
B ≡ A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |cBR(q1).B31,n|cBR〈sigR1 〉.R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B31,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
Since
A′ = A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B31,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(8) We have
A ≡ A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B31,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B31,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
RR n° 7781
48 Cortier & Wiedling
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |if φs(idpR, q1) then B3.11,n else 0|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ
and it follows from Lemma 28 and Lemma 29 applied to ball1σ that
φs(idpR, q1) {ball1/x1 ,ball
′
1 /p1 ,
sigR1 /q1}σ = true and
A′ ≡ A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B3.11,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ.
It follows from
B ≡ A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |if φs(idpR, q1) then B3.11,n else 0|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
and from Lemma 28 and Lemma 29 applied to ball1τ that φs(idpR, q1){ball1/x1 ,
ball′1/p1 ,
sigR1 /q1}τ = true and B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B3.11,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
Since
A′ = A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B3.11,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(9) We have
A ≡ A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B3.11,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B3.11,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A5
[
c1(con1).V
5
1 |V 12 |c1〈q1〉.B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ
and
A′ ≡ A6
[
V 51 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ.
It follows from
B ≡ A5
[
c1(con1).V
5
1 |V 12 |c1〈q1〉.B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A6
[
V 51 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
Since
A′ = A6
[
V 51 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(12) We have
A ≡ A8
[
V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A8
[
V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
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If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A8
[
if φv(idpR, id1, hv1, con1, xvote1 , rec1) then V
8
1 else 0|V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ
and it follows from Lemma 29 applied to ball1σ that φv(idpR, id1, hv1, con1,
xvote1 , rec1){ball1/x1 ,ball
′
1 /p1 ,
sigR1 /q1 ,
r1 /rec1 ,
q1 /con1}σ = true and
A′ ≡ A8
[
V 81 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ.
It follows from
B ≡ A8
[
if φv(idpR, id1, hv1, con1, xvote1 , rec1) then V
8
1 else 0|V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
and the Lemma 29 applied to ball1τ that φv(idpR, id1, hv1, con1, xvote1 , rec1)
{ball1/x1 ,ball
′
1 /p1 ,
sigR1 /q1 ,
r1 /rec1 ,
q1 /con1}τ = true and B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A8
[
V 81 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
Since
A′ = A8
[
V 81 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(13) We have
A ≡ A8
[
V 81 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A8
[
V 81 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
τ.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A8
[
c1〈Ok〉|V 12 |c1(sy1).B12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ
and
A′ ≡ A8
[
V 12 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ.
It follows from
B ≡ A8
[
c1〈Ok〉|V 12 |c1(sy1).B12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A8
[
V 12 |B12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
Since
A′ = A8
[
V 12 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(15) We have
A ≡ A9
[
V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A9
[
V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
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If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A9
[
c2〈ball2〉.V 32 |c2(x2).B1.12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A10
[
V 32 |B1.12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A9
[
c2〈ball2〉.V 32 |c2(x2).B1.12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A10
[
V 32 |B1.12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ = A10
[
V 32 |B1.12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′
, we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(16) We have
A ≡ A10
[
V 32 |B1.12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A10
[
V 32 |B1.12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A10
[
V 32 |if φb(idp2, x2) then B1.22,n else 0|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
Since x2 refers to ball2, it follows from Lemma 29 applied to ball2ΣL that
it is a id2-valid ballot and from Lemma 28 that φb(idp2, x2){ball2/x2}ΣL =
true and
A′ ≡ A10
[
V 32 |B1.22,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A10
[
V 32 |if φb(idp2, x2) then B1.22,n else 0|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
and from Lemma 29 and Lemma 28 applied to ball2ΣR, since φb(idp2, x2)
{ball2/x2}ΣR = true, that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A10
[
V 32 |B1.22,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ ≡ A10
[
V 32 |B1.22,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(17) We have
A ≡ A10
[
V 32 |B1.22,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A10
[
V 32 |B1.22,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
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If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A10
[
V 32 |cBR〈ball′2〉.B22,n|cBR(p2).R22,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R22,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A10
[
V 32 |cBR〈ball′2〉.B22,n|cBR(p2).R22,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R22,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ = A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R22,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(18) We have
A ≡ A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R22,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R22,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|if φr(idp2, p2) then R32,n else 0|D11,n
]
ΣL
and it follows from Lemma 28, since ball2ΣL is verifying Lemma 29, that
φr(idp2, p2){ball2/x2 ,ball
′
2 /p2}σ = true, thus
A′ ≡ A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R32,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|if φr(idp2, p2) then R32,n else 0|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
and Lemma 28 and Lemma 29 applied to ball2ΣR that φr(idp2, p2){ball2/x2 ,
ball′2/p2}ΣR = true thus B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R32,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣL.
Since
A′ = A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R32,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(19) We have
A ≡ A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R32,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R32,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
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If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A11
[
cRV2(rec2).V
4
2 |B22,n|cRV2〈r2〉.R42,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A12
[
V 42 |B22,n|R42,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A11
[
cRV2(rec2).V
4
2 |B22,n|cRV2〈r2〉.R42,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A12
[
V 42 |B22,n|R42,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ = A12
[
V 42 |B22,n|R42,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(20) We have
A ≡ A12
[
V 42 |B22,n|R42,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A12
[
V 42 |B22,n|R42,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A12
[
V 42 |cBR(q2).B32,n|cBR〈sigR2 〉.R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A13
[
V 42 |B32,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A12
[
V 42 |cBR(q2).B32,n|cBR〈sigR2 〉.R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A13
[
V 42 |B32,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ = A13
[
V 42 |B32,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(21) We have
A ≡ A13
[
V 42 |B32,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A13
[
V 42 |B32,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A13
[
V 42 |if φs(idpR, q2) then B3.12,n else 0|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
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and it follows from Lemma 28 and Lemma 29 applied to ball2ΣL that
φs(idpR, q2){ball2/x2 ,ball
′
2 /p2 ,
sigR2 /q2}ΣL = true and
A′ ≡ A13
[
V 42 |B3.12,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A13
[
V 42 |if φs(idpR, q2) then B3.12,n else 0|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
and Lemma 28 and Lemma 29 applied to ball2ΣR that φs(idpR, q2){ball2/x2 ,
ball′2/p2 ,
sigR2 /q2}ΣR = true and B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A13
[
V 42 |B3.12,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ = A13
[
V 42 |B3.12,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(22) We have
A ≡ A13
[
V 42 |B3.12,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A13
[
V 42 |B3.12,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A13
[
c2(con2).V
5
2 |c2〈q2〉.B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A14
[
V 52 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A13
[
c2(con2).V
5
2 |c2〈q2〉.B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A14
[
V 52 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ = A14
[
V 52 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(25) We have
A ≡ A13
[
V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A13
[
V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A13
[
if φv(idpR, id2, hv2, con2, xvote2 , rec2) then V
8
2 else 0|B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
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and it follows from Lemma 29 applied to ball2ΣL that φv(idpR, id2, hv2, con2,
xvote2 , rec2){ball2/x2 ,ball
′
2 /p2 ,
sigR2 /q2 ,
r2 /rec2 ,
q2 /con2}ΣL = true and
A′ ≡ A13
[
V 82 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A13
[
if φv(idpR, id2, hv2, con2, xvote2 , rec2) then V
8
2 else 0|B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
and the Lemma 29 applied to ball2ΣR that φv(idpR, id2, hv2, con2, xvote2 , rec2)
{ball2/x2 ,ball
′
2 /p2 ,
sigR2 /q2 ,
r2 /rec2 ,
q2 /con2}ΣR = true and B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A13
[
V 82 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ = A13
[
V 82 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(26) We have
A ≡ A13
[
V 82 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A13
[
V 82 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A13
[
c2〈Ok〉|c2(sy2).B13,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A13
[
B13,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A13
[
c2〈Ok〉|c2(sy2).B13,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A13
[
B13,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ = A13
[
B13,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(28) We have
A ≡ A1i
[
B1.1i,n{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A1i
[
B1.1i,n{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
for some i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, N3, . . . , Ni−1 such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-
valid ballots for k = 3 . . . i− 1, and a term Mi such that
fv(Mi)∪
⋃
3≤j≤i−1
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1i ) and (fn(Mi)∪
⋃
3≤j≤i−1
fn(Nj))∩bn(A1i ) = ∅.
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If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A1i
[
if φb(idpi, xi){Mi/xi} then P else 0|R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
with P = B1.2i,n . We also have
B ≡ A1i
[
if φb(idpi, xi){Mi/xi} then P else 0|R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
We proceed by case analysis on the structure of A′:
• If A′ ≡ A2i
[
P |R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL, then Miθi−1σi−1N˜ ΣL , which is equal to
xiΣL in the A1i context, must have passed φ
idi
b , is a idi-valid ballot.
From Corollary 21, since we deduce that xiΣR, in the A1i context,
is also a valid ballot and then B −→ B′ = A2i
[
B1.2i,n |R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since A′ ≡ A2i
[
B1.2i,n |R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′, we derive A′ R B′ by the
closure of R under structural equivalence.
• If A′ ≡ A1i
[
0{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL, then xiΣL, in the A1i context,
must not have passed φidib , then xiΣL is not idi-valid ballot. From
Corollary 21, we deduce that xiΣR is not a valid ballot either and
then B −→ B′ = A1i
[
0{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR. Since A′ ≡ A1i [0
{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′, we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R
under structural equivalence.
(29) We have
A ≡ A2i
[
B1.2i,n |R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A2i
[
B1.2i,n |R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
for some i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, N3, . . . , Ni such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid
ballots for k = 3 . . . i, and such that⋃
3≤j≤i
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1i ) and
⋃
3≤j≤i
fn(Nj)) ∩ bn(A1i ) = ∅.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A2i
[
cBR〈ball′i〉.B2i,n|cBR(pi).R2i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|R2i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A2i
[
cBR〈ball′i〉.B2i,n|cBR(pi).R2i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A3i
[
B2i,n|R2i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
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Since
A′ ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|R2i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(30) We have
A ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|R2i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|R2i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
for some i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, N3, . . . , Ni such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid
ballots for k = 3 . . . i, and such that⋃
3≤j≤i
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1i ) and
⋃
3≤j≤i
fn(Nj)) ∩ bn(A1i ) = ∅.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|if φr(idpi, pi) then R3i,n else 0|D11,n
]
ΣL
and it follows from Lemma 28, since Niθi−1σi−1N˜ ΣL is a idi-valid ballot,
that φr(idpi, pi){balli/xi , ball
′
i/pi}ΣL = true, thus
A′ ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|R3i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|if φr(idpi, pi) then R3i,n else 0|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
and from Lemma 28 that φr(idpi, pi){balli/xi ,ball
′
i /pi}ΣR = true since
Niθi−1 σi−1N ΣR is a idi-valid ballot. Thus B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A3i
[
B2i,n|R3i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|R3i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(32) We have
A ≡ A4i
[
B2i,n|R4i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A4i
[
B2i,n|R4i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
for some i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, N3, . . . , Ni such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid
ballots for k = 3 . . . i, and such that⋃
3≤j≤i
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1i ) and
⋃
3≤j≤i
fn(Nj)) ∩ bn(A1i ) = ∅.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A4i
[
cBR(qi).B
3
i,n|cBR〈sigRi 〉.R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
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and
A′ ≡ A5i
[
B3i,n|R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A4i
[
cBR(qi).B
3
i,n|cBR〈sigRi 〉.R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A5i
[
B3i,n|R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ ≡ A5i
[
B3i,n|R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(33) We have
A ≡ A5i
[
B3i,n|R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A5i
[
B3i,n|R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
for some i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, N3, . . . , Ni such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid
ballots for k = 3 . . . i, and such that⋃
3≤j≤i
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1i ) and
⋃
3≤j≤i
fn(Nj)) ∩ bn(A1i ) = ∅.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A5i
[
if φs(idpR, qi) then B3.1i,n else 0|R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and it follows from Lemma 28, since Niθi−1σi−1N˜ ΣL is a idi-valid ballot,
that φs(idpR, qi){balli/xi ,ball
′
i /pi ,
sigRi /qi}ΣL = true, thus
A′ ≡ A5i
[
B3.1i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A5i
[
if φs(idpR, qi) then B3.1i,n else 0|R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
and from Lemma 28 that φs(idpR, qi){balli/xi ,ball
′
i /pi ,
sigRi /qi}ΣR = true
since Niθi−1σi−1N˜ ΣR is a idi-valid ballot. Thus B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A5i
[
B3.1i,n |R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ ≡ A5i
[
B3.1i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
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(36) We have
A ≡ A′i
[
B4i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A′i
[
B4i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
for some N3, . . . , Nn such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid ballots for
k = 3 . . . n, and such that⋃
3≤j≤n
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1n) and
⋃
3≤j≤n
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1n) = ∅.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A′i
[
cBD〈Π1(xi)〉.B4i+1,n|cBD(di).D1i+1,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A′i+1
[
B4i+1,n|D1i+1,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A′i
[
cBD〈Π1(xi)〉.B4i+1,n|cBD(di).D
1
i+1,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A′i+1
[
B4i+1,n|D
1
i+1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ ≡ A′i+1
[
B4i+1,n|D1i+1,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
Labelled Reductions : We must show for all extended processes A and
B, where A R B, that if A α−→ A′ for some A′, then B −→∗ α−→−→∗ B′ and
A′ R B′ for some B′. We observe that if A R B by an other relation than (1),
(10), (11), (14), (23), (24), (27), (31), (34), (35) or (37) to (40) then there is no
extended process A′ such that A α−→ A′. We proceed by case analysis on the
remaining cases.
(1) We have
A ≡ A0
[
V 11 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
and B ≡ A0
[
V 11 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A0
[
νt1.cout〈ball1〉.V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
and
A′ ≡ A1
[
V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ
where α = νb1.cout〈b1〉 and b1 /∈ dom(A0). It follows from
B ≡ A0
[
νt1.cout〈ball1〉.V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
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that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A1
[
V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
We have
A1
[
V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(10) We have
A ≡ A6
[
V 51 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A6
[
V 51 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A6
[
cout〈rec1〉.V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ
and
A′ ≡ A7
[
V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ
where α = νy1.cout〈y1〉 and y1 /∈ dom(A6). It follows from
B ≡ A6
[
cout〈rec1〉.V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A7
[
V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
We have
A7
[
V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(11) We have
A ≡ A7
[
V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A7
[
V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A7
[
cout〈con1〉.V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ
and
A′ ≡ A8
[
V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ
where α = νz1.cout〈z1〉 and z1 /∈ dom(A7). It follows from
B ≡ A7
[
cout〈con1〉.V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
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that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A8
[
V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ.
We have
A8
[
V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(14) We have
A ≡ A8
[
V 12 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ and B ≡ A8
[
V 12 |B12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A8
[
νt2.cout〈ball2〉.V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
σ
and
A′ ≡ A9
[
V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
where α = νb2.cout〈b2〉 and b2 /∈ dom(A8). It follows from
B ≡ A8
[
νt2.cout〈ball2〉.V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
τ
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A9
[
V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A9
[
V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(23) We have
A ≡ A14
[
V 52 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A14
[
V 52 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A14
[
cout〈rec2〉.V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A15
[
V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
where α = νy2.cout〈〈〉y2〉 and y2 /∈ dom(A14). It follows from
B ≡ A14
[
cout〈rec2〉.V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
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that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A15
[
V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A15
[
V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(24) We have
A ≡ A15
[
V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A15
[
V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A15
[
cout〈con2〉.V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A13
[
V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
where α = νz2.cout〈z2〉 and z2 /∈ dom(A15). It follows from
B ≡ A15
[
cout〈con2〉.V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A13
[
V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A13
[
V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(27) We have
A ≡ A1i
[
B1i,n|R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A1i
[
B1i,n|R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
for some i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, N3, . . . , Ni−1 such that Nkθk−1σk−1N ΣL are idk-
valid ballots for k = 3 . . . i− 1 and⋃
3≤j≤i−1
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1i ) and
⋃
3≤j≤i−1
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1i ) = ∅.
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A1i
[
ci(xi).B
1.1
i,n |R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A1i
[
B1.1i,n{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
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where α = ci(Mi) for some term Mi such that fn(α) ∩ bn(A1i ) = ∅. It
follows from
B ≡ A1i
[
ci(xi).B
1.1
i,n |R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A1i
[
B1.1i,n{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A1i
[
B1.1i,n{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(31) We have
A ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|R3i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|R3i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
for some i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, N3, . . . , Ni such that Nkθk−1σk−1N ΣL are idk-valid
ballots for k = 3 . . . i and⋃
3≤j≤i
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1i ) and
⋃
3≤j≤i
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1i ) = ∅.
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|cRVi〈ri〉.R4i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A4i
[
B2i,n|R4i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
where α = νyi.cRVi〈yi〉 and yi /∈ dom(A3i ). It follows from
B ≡ A3i
[
B2i,n|cRVi〈ri〉.R4i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A4i
[
B2i,n|R4i,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A4i
[
B2i,n|R4i,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(34) We have
A ≡ A5i
[
B3.1i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A5i
[
B3.1i,n |R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
for some i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, N3, . . . , Ni such that Nkθk−1σk−1N ΣL are idk-valid
ballots for k = 3 . . . i and⋃
3≤j≤i
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1i ) and
⋃
3≤j≤i
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1i ) = ∅.
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If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A5i
[
ci〈qi〉.B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A6i
[
B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
where α = νzi.ci〈zi〉 and zi /∈ dom(A5i ). It follows from
B ≡ A5i
[
ci〈qi〉.B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A6i
[
B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A6i
[
B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(35) We have
A ≡ A6i
[
B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A6i
[
B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
for some i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, N3, . . . , Ni such that Nkθk−1σk−1N ΣL are idk-valid
ballots for k = 3 . . . i and⋃
3≤j≤i
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1i ) and
⋃
3≤j≤i
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1i ) = ∅.
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α)∩ bn(B) = ∅, then there
are two cases :
– If 3 ≤ i < n.
A6i
[
ci(syi).B
1
i+1,n|R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A1i+1
[
B1i+1,n|R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
where α = ci(Wi) for some term Wi such that fn(α) ∩ bn(A6i ) = ∅.
It follows from
B ≡ A6i
[
ci(syi).B
1
i+1,n|R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A1i+1
[
B1i+1,n|R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A1i+1
[
B1i+1,n|R1i+1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
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– If i = n. A6n
[
cn(syn).B
4
1,n|D11,n
]
ΣL and A′ ≡ A′1
[
B41,n|D11,n
]
ΣL
where α = cn(Wn) for some term Wn such that fn(α) ∩ bn(A6n) = ∅.
It follows from B ≡ A6n
[
cn(syn).B
4
1,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR that B
α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A′1
[
B41,n|D
1
1,n
]
ΣR. We have A′1
[
B41,n|D11,n
]
ΣL R B′, and de-
rive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(37) We have
A ≡ A′n+1
[
D21,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A′n+1
[
D
2
1,n
]
ΣR
for some N3, . . . , Nn such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid ballots for
k = 3 . . . n, and such that⋃
3≤j≤n
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1n) and
⋃
3≤j≤n
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1n) = ∅.
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A′n+1
[
cout〈dec1〉.D22,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A′′1
[
D22,n
]
ΣL
where α = ν result1.cout〈result1〉 and result1 /∈ dom(A′n+1). It follows
from
B ≡ A′n+1
[
cout〈dec2〉.D22,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A′′1
[
D
2
2,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A′′1
[
D22,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(38) We have
A ≡ A′′1
[
D22,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A′′1
[
D
2
2,n
]
ΣR
for some N3, . . . , Nn such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid ballots for
k = 3 . . . n, and such that⋃
3≤j≤n
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1n) and
⋃
3≤j≤n
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1n) = ∅.
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ bn(B) = ∅, then it
must be the case that
A ≡ A′′1
[
cout〈dec2〉.D23,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A′′2
[
D23,n
]
ΣL
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where α = ν result2.cout〈result2〉 and result2 /∈ dom(A′′1). It follows from
B ≡ A′′1
[
Out[cout]dec1.D
2
3,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A′′2
[
D
2
3,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A′′2
[
D23,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(39) We have
A ≡ A′′i−1
[
D2i,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A′′i−1
[
D
2
i,n
]
ΣR
for some N3, . . . , Nn such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid ballots for
k = 3 . . . n, and such that⋃
3≤j≤n
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1n) and
⋃
3≤j≤n
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1n) = ∅.
If A α−→ A′ such that fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α)∩ bn(B) = ∅, then there
are two cases :
– If 3 ≤ i < n.
A′′i−1
[
cout〈deci〉.D2i+1,n
]
ΣL and A′ ≡ A′′i
[
D21+1,n
]
ΣL
where α = ν result i.cout〈result i〉 and result i /∈ dom(A′′i−1). It follows
from
B ≡ A′′i−1
[
cout〈deci〉.D2i+1,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A′′i
[
D
2
i+1,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A′′i
[
D21+1,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
– If i = n.
A′′n−1 [cout〈decn〉] ΣL and A′ ≡ A′′n [0] ΣL
where α = ν resultn.cout〈resultn〉 and resultn /∈ dom(A′′n−1). It fol-
lows from
B ≡ A′′n−1 [cout〈decn〉] ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A′′n [0] ΣR.
We have
A′′n [0] ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
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B.5 Proving the Theorem 4
As R is verifying the three properties of Definition 2, we have to show that
for all extended processes A and B, where ARB, that A ≈s B. Using Lemma
9, it is sufficient to prove that A′′n [0] ΣL ≈s A
′′
n [0] ΣR for any Ni such that
Niθi−1σi−1N˜ Σ are idi-valid ballots. As A
′′
n [0] ΣL is mapped in n˜.(θ|R)σN˜ΣL and
A
′′
n [0] ΣR is mapped in n˜.(θ|R)σN˜ΣR, we conclude using Proposition 8.

C Proof of Theorem 3
Let us remind the Theorem we need to prove.
Theorem 3. Let n be the number of voters. The Norwegian e-voting protocol
process specification satisfies ballot secrecy with the auditing process, even with
n− 2 voters are corrupted, provided that the other components are honest.
An[V {c1/cauth ,cRV1 /cRV }σ | V {c2/cauth ,cRV2 /cRV }τ ]
≈l An [V {c1/cauth ,cRV1 /cRV }τ |V {c2/cauth ,cRV2 /cRV }σ]
where σ = {v1/xvote} and τ = {v2/xvote}.
Let us introduce the relation we will use to prove labeled bisimilarity.
C.1 Partial evolutions of protocol specification
First, we will introduce partial evolutions of the protocol process specification
and remind some notations used. One can note that the notations are the same
as those we used in the previous section when proving Theorem 4, since we
redefine them here, there are no possible confusion.
Definition 30. Notations and partial evolutions for honest voters. (i ∈ {1, 2})
V 1i = cout〈balli〉.V 2i ei = penc(xivote, ti, pk(a1))
V 2i = ci〈balli〉.V 3i pfk i = pfk1(idi, ti, xivote, ei)
V 3i = cRVi(reci).V
4
i sigi = sign((ei, pfk i), idi)
V 4i = ci(coni).V
5
i balli = (ei, pfk i, sigi)
V 5i = cout〈coni〉.V 6i hvi = hash((vk(idi), ei, pfk i, sigi))
V 6i = cout〈reci〉.V 7i
V 7i = if φv(idpR, idi, hvi, coni, xvotei , reci) then V 8i else 0
V 8i = ci〈Ok〉
Definition 31. Notations and partial evolutions for the ballot box. (i ∈ {1, . . . , n})
B1i,n = ci(xi).B
1.1
i,n e
′
i = renc(Π1(xi), s(idi))
B1.1i,n = if φb(idpi, xi) then B1.2i,n else 0 pfk
′
i = pfk2(idi, a2,Π1(xi), e
′
i)
B1.2i,n = cBR〈ball′i〉.B2i,n e′′i = blind(e′i, s(idi))
B2i,n = cBR(qi).B
3
i,n pfk
′′
i = pfk2(idi, s(idi), e
′
i, e
′′
i )
B3i,n = if φs(idpR, hbbi, qi) then B3.1i,n else 0 ball′i = (xi, e′i, pfk
′
i, e
′′
i , pfk
′′
i )
B3.1i,n = ci〈qi〉.B3.2i,n hbbi = hash((vk(idi), xi))
B3.2i,n = ci(syi).B
1
i+1,n
B3.2n,n = cn(syn).B
4
1,n
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B4i,n = cBD〈Π1(xi)〉.B4i+1,n
B4n,n = cBD〈Π1(xn)〉.B51,n
B5i,n = cBA〈xi〉.B5i+1,n
B5n,n = cBA〈xn〉
Definition 32. Notations et and partial evolutions for the receipt generator.
(i ∈ {1, . . . , n})
R1i,n = cBR(pi).R
2
i,n
R2i,n = if φr(idpi, pi) then R3i,n else 0
R3i,n = cRVi〈ri〉.R4i,n ri = d(p(idi), dec(Π6(pi), a3))
R4i,n = cBR〈sigRi 〉.R1i+1,n hbri = hash((idpi,Π1(pi),Π2(pi),Π3(pi)))
R4n,n= cBR〈sigRn 〉.R51,n sigRi = sign(hbri, idR)
R5i,n = cRA〈(idpi, hbpri, hbri)〉.R5i+1,n
R5n,n= cBR〈(idpi, hbpri, hbri)〉
Definition 33. Notations and partial evolutions for the decryption service, we
distinguish two cases : one without a swap (D) and one with swap (D).(i ∈
{1, . . . , n})
deci = dec(di, a1) D
1
i,n = cBD(dj).D
1
i+1,n
D
1
n,n = cBD(dn).D
2
1
D1i,n = cBD(di).D
1
i+1,n D
2
1 = cDA〈hash((d1, . . . , dn))〉.D
2
2
D1n,n= cBD(dn).D
2
1,n D
2
2 = cDA(h).D
3
1,n
D21 = cDA〈hash((d1, . . . , dn))〉.D22 D
3
1,n = cout〈dec2〉.D
2
2,n
D22 = cDA(h).D
3
1,n D
3
2,n = cout〈dec1〉.D
2
3,n
D3i,n = cout〈deci〉.D3i+1,n D
3
i,n = cout〈deci〉.D
2
i+1,n
D3n,n= cout〈decn〉 D
3
n,n = cout〈decn〉
Definition 34. Partial evolutions for the auditor. (j ∈ {1, . . . , n})
AD1 = cDA(hd).AD
2
1,n
AD2j,n= cBA(baj).AD
2
j+1,n
AD2n,n= cBA(ban).AD
3
1,n
AD3j,n= cRA(haj).AD
3
j+1,n
AD3n,n= cRA(han).AD
4
1
AD41 = if φa(ba1, ha1, idp1, . . . , ban, han, idpn, h, hd) then AD42 else 0
AD42 = cDA〈Ok〉
Definition 35. Partial evolutions of global process representing the enrichment
of the frame as the process advances.
n˜ = (a1, a2, id1, id2, idR, c1, c2, cRV1 , cRV2 , cBR, cBD)
Γ = {pk(a1)/g1 ,pk(a2) /g2 ,pk(a3) /g3 ,vk(id1) /idp1 , . . . ,vk(idn) /idpn ,vk(idR) /idpR}
A0 = νn˜. [_|Γ]
A1 = ν(n˜, t1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|Γ
]
A2 = ν(n˜, t1, x1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|{ball1/x1}|Γ
]
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A3 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|{ball1/x1}|{ball
′
1/p1}|Γ
]
A4 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|{ball1/x1}|{ball
′
1/p1}|{r1/rec1}|Γ
]
A5 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|{ball1/x1}|{ball
′
1/p1}|{r1/rec1}|
{sigR1 /q1}|Γ
]
A6 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1).
[
_|{ball1/b1}|{ball1/x1}|{ball
′
1/p1}|{r1/rec1}|
{sigR1 /q1}|{q1/con1}|Γ
]
A7 = A6 [_|{rec1/y1}]
A8 = A7 [_|{con1/z1}]
A9 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|i = 1, 2}|{ball1/x1}|
{ball′1/p1}|{r1/rec1}|{sig
R
1 /q1}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ
]
A10 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2, x2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|{balli/xi}|i = 1, 2}|
{ball′1/p1}|{r1/rec1}|{sig
R
1 /q1}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ
]
A11 =ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2, x2, p2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|{balli/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi}
|i = 1, 2}|{r1/rec1}|{sig
R
1 /q1}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ
]
A12 =ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2, x2, p2, rec2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|{balli/xi}|
{ball′i/pi |{ri/reci}}|i = 1, 2}|{sig
R
1 /q1}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ
]
A13 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2, x2, p2, rec2, q2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|{balli/xi}|
{ball′i/pi |{ri/reci}|{sig
R
i /qi}}|i = 1, 2}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ
]
A14 = ν(n˜, t1, x1, p1, rec1, q1, con1, t2, x2, p2, rec2, q2, con2).
[
_|{{balli/bi}|
{balli/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi |{ri/reci}|{sig
R
i /qi}|{q1/con1}}|i = 1, 2}|
{rec1/y1}|{con1/z1}|Γ]
A15 =A14 [_|{rec2/y2}]
For i ∈ {3, . . . , n} :
m˜i = {(pk, qk)|k ∈ {3, . . . , i− 1}}
Λ = {{balli/bi}|{balli/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi |{ri/reci}|{sig
R
i /qi}|{q1/con1}|{rec1/y1 |
{con1/z1}}|i = 1, 2}
Λi = {{Nk/xk}|{ball
′
k/pk}|{rk/yk}|{sig
R
k /qk}|{qk/zk}|{Wk/syk}|
k ∈ {3, . . . , i− 1}}
A1i = ν(n˜, m˜i). [_|Λi|Λ|Γ]
A2i = A
1
i
[
_|{Ni/xi}
]
A3i = ν(n˜, m˜i, pi).
[
_|{Ni/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi}|Λi|Λ|Γ
]
A4i = A
3
i [_|{ri/yi}]
A5i = ν(n˜, m˜i+1).
[
_|{Ni/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi}|{ri/yi}|{sig
R
i /qi}|Λi|Λ|Γ
]
A6i = ν(n˜, m˜i+1).
[
_|{Ni/xi}|{ball
′
i/pi}|{ri/yi}|{sig
R
i /qi}|{qi/zi}|Λi|Λ|Γ
]
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
d˜i = {dk|k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}}
Ωi = {{Π1(xk)/dk}|k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}}
A7i = ν(n˜, m˜n+1, d˜i). [_|Ωi|Λn+1|Λ|Γ]
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b˜ai = {bak|k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}}
Θi = {{Π1(xk)/dk}|k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}}
A8i = ν(n˜, m˜n+1, d˜n+1, hd, b˜ai).
[
_|Θi|{hash((d1,...,dn))/hd}|
Ωn+1|Λn+1|Λ|Γ]
h˜ai = {hak|k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}}
∆i = {{Π1(xk)/dk}|k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}}
A9i = ν(n˜, m˜n+1, d˜n+1, hd, b˜an+1, h˜ai).
[
_|∆i|Θn+1|{hash((d1,...,dn))/hd}|Ωn+1|
Λn+1|Λ|Γ]
A′ = ν(n˜, m˜n+1, d˜n+1, hd, b˜an+1, h˜an+1, h).
[
_|{Ok/h}|∆n+1|Θn+1|
{hash((d1,...,dn))/hd}|Ωn+1|Λn+1|Λ|Γ
]
A′′1 = A
′ [_|{dec1/result1}]
A′′i = A
′′
i−1
[
_|{deci/resulti}
]
A
′′
1 = A
′ [_|{{dec2/result1}]
A
′′
2 = A
′′
1
[
_|{{dec1/result2}
]
A
′′
i = A
′′
i−1
[
_|{deci/resulti}
]
C.2 Relation
Now we can define the relation.
Definition 36. Given integer n ≥ 2, ∀ 3 ≤ j ≤ n, let Mj and Nj terms
such that Njθj−1σ
j−1
N˜
ΣL is an idj-valid ballot, and such that fv(Mj)∪ fv(Nj) ⊆
dom(A1j ) and (fn(Mj)∪ fn(Nj))∩bn(A1j ) = ∅. We consider the smallest relation
R which is closed under structural equivalence and includes the following pairs
of extended processes :
A0
[
V 11 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n|AD1
] ∼R A0 [V 11 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n|AD1] (1)
A1
[
V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A1
[
V 21 |V 12 |B11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ (2)
A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.11,n|R11,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.11,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ (3)
A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.21,n|R11,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A2
[
V 31 |V 12 |B1.21,n|R11,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ (4)
A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R21,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R21,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ (5)
A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R31,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A3
[
V 31 |V 12 |B21,n|R31,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ (6)
A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |B21,n|R41,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A4
[
V 41 |V 12 |B21,n|R41,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ (7)
A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B31,n|R12,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B31,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ (8)
A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B3.11,n|R12,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A5
[
V 41 |V 12 |B3.11,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ (9)
A6
[
V 51 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A6
[
V 51 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ
(10)
A7
[
V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A7
[
V 61 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ
(11)
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A8
[
V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A8
[
V 71 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ
(12)
A8
[
V 81 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A8
[
V 81 |V 12 |B3.21,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ
(13)
A8
[
V 12 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n|AD1
]
σ ∼R A8
[
V 12 |B12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
τ (14)
A9
[
V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A9
[
V 22 |B12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (15)
A10
[
V 32 |B1.12,n|R12,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A10
[
V 32 |B1.12,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
|AD1ΣR
(16)
A10
[
V 32 |B1.22,n|R12,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A10
[
V 32 |B1.22,n|R12,n|D
1
1,n
]
|AD1ΣR
(17)
A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R22,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R22,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR
(18)
A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R32,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A11
[
V 32 |B22,n|R32,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR
(19)
A12
[
V 42 |B22,n|R42,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A12
[
V 42 |B22,n|R42,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR
(20)
A13
[
V 42 |B32,n|R13,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A13
[
V 42 |B32,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR
(21)
A13
[
V 42 |B3.12,n|R13,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A13
[
V 42 |B3.12,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR
(22)
A14
[
V 52 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A14
[
V 52 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR
(23)
A15
[
V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A15
[
V 62 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR
(24)
A13
[
V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A13
[
V 72 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (25)
A13
[
V 82 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A13
[
V 82 |B3.22,n|R13,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (26)
(i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, R1n+1,n = R51,n)
A1i
[
B1i,n|R1i,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A1i
[
B1i,n|R1i,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (27)
A1i
[
B1.1i,n{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A1i
[
B1.1i,n{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR
(28)
A2i
[
B1.2i,n |R1i,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A2i
[
B1.2i,n |R1i,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (29)
A3i
[
B2i,n|R2i,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A3i
[
B2i,n|R2i,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (30)
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A3i
[
B2i,n|R3i,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A3i
[
B2i,n|R3i,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (31)
A4i
[
B2i,n|R4i,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A4i
[
B2i,n|R4i,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (32)
A5i
[
B3i,n|R1i+1,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A5i
[
B3i,n|R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (33)
A5i
[
B3.1i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A5i
[
B3.1i,n |R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (34)
A6i
[
B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D11,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A6i
[
B3.2i,n |R1i+1,n|D
1
1,n|AD1
]
ΣR (35)
(i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {3, . . . , n})
A7i
[
B4i,n|R51,n|D1i,n|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A7i
[
B4i,n|R51,n|D
1
i,n|AD1
]
ΣR (36)
A7n+1
[
B51,n|R51,n|D21|AD1
]
ΣL ∼R A7n+1
[
B51,n|R51,n|D
2
1|AD1
]
ΣR (37)
A8i
[
B5i,n|R51,n|D22|AD2i,n
]
ΣL ∼R A8i
[
B5i,n|R51,n|D
2
2|AD2i,n
]
ΣR (38)
A9i
[
R5i,n|D22|AD3i,n
]
ΣL ∼R A9i
[
R5i,n|D
2
2|AD3i,n
]
ΣR (39)
A9n+1
[
D22|AD41
]
ΣL ∼R A9n+1
[
D
2
2|AD41
]
ΣR (40)
A9n+1
[
D22|AD42
]
ΣL ∼R A9n+1
[
D
2
2|AD42
]
ΣR (41)
A′
[
D21,n
]
ΣL ∼R A′
[
D
2
1,n
]
ΣR (42)
A′′1
[
D22,n
]
ΣL ∼R A′′1
[
D
2
2,n
]
ΣR (43)
A′′j−1
[
D2j,n
]
ΣL ∼R A′′j−1
[
D
2
j,n
]
ΣR (44)
A′′n [0] ΣL ∼R A
′′
n [0] ΣR (45)
(i ∈ {3, . . . , n})
A1i
[{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n]ΣL ∼R A1i [{Mi/xi}|R1i,n|D11,n]ΣR (46)
C.3 Proof for the relation
The proof is quite the same as the one without auditor since most of equiv-
alences are identical except that we add a auditor part in parallel, or rename
some partial states of processes. There modified cases are equivalences (37)
to (41) which are basically representing the auditor’s behaviour and can only
evolve with internal reduction.
Internal Reductions : We must show for all extended processes A and
B, where A R B, that if A −→ A′ for some A′, then B −→ B′ and A′ R B′ for
some B′.
(37) We have
A ≡ A7n+1
[
B51,n|R51,n|D21|AD1
]
ΣL and B ≡ A7n+1
[
B51,n|R51,n|D
2
1|AD1
]
ΣR
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for some N3, . . . , Nn such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid ballots for
k = 3 . . . n, and such that⋃
3≤j≤n
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1n) and
⋃
3≤j≤n
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1n) = ∅.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A7n+1
[
B51,n|R51,n|cDA〈hash((d1, . . . , dn))〉.D22|cDA(hd).AD21,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A81
[
B51,n|R51,n|D22|AD21,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A7n+1
[
B51,n|R51,n|cDA〈hash((d1, . . . , dn))〉.D
2
2|cDA(hd).AD21,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A81
[
B51,n|R51,n|D
2
2|AD21,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ ≡ A81
[
B51,n|R51,n|D22|AD21,n
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(38) We have
A ≡ A8i
[
B5i,n|R51,n|D22|AD2i,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A81
[
B5i,n|R51,n|D
2
2|AD2i,n
]
ΣR
for some N3, . . . , Nn such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid ballots for
k = 3 . . . n, and such that⋃
3≤j≤n
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1n) and
⋃
3≤j≤n
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1n) = ∅.
We have two cases :
• If 1 ≤ i < n.
A8i
[
cBA〈xi〉.B5i+1,n|R51,n|D22|cBA(bai).AD2i+1,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A8i+1
[
B5i+1,n|R51,n|D22|AD2i+1,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A8i
[
cBA〈xi〉.B5i+1,n|R51,n|D
2
2|cBA(bai).AD2i+1,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A8i+1
[
B5i+1,n|R51,n|D
2
2|AD2i+1,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A8i+1
[
B5i+1,n|R51,n|D22|AD2i+1,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
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• If i = n.
A8n
[
cBA〈xn〉|R51,n|D22|cBA(ban).AD31,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A91
[
R51,n|D22|AD31,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A8n
[
cBA〈xn〉|R51,n|D
2
2|cBA(ban).AD31,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A91
[
R51,n|D
2
2|AD31,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A91
[
R51,n|D22|AD31,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(39) We have
A ≡ A9i
[
R5i,n|D22|AD3i,n
]
ΣL and B ≡ A91
[
R5i,n|D
2
2|AD3i,n
]
ΣR
for some N3, . . . , Nn such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid ballots for
k = 3 . . . n, and such that⋃
3≤j≤n
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1n) and
⋃
3≤j≤n
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1n) = ∅.
We have two cases :
• If 1 ≤ i < n.
A9i
[
cRA〈(idpi, hbpri, hbri)〉.R5i+1,n|D22|cRA(hai).AD3i+1,n
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A9i+1
[
R5i+1,n|D22|AD3i+1,n
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A9i
[
cRA〈(idpi, hbpri, hbri)〉.R5i+1,n|D
2
2|cRA(hai).AD3i+1,n
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A9i+1
[
R5i+1,n|D
2
2|AD3i+1,n
]
ΣR.
We have
A9i+1
[
R5i+1,n|D22|AD3i+1,n
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
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• If i = n.
A9n
[
cRA〈(idpn, hbprn, hbrn)〉|D22|cRA(han).AD41
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A9n+1
[
D22|AD41
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A9n
[
cRA〈(idpn, hbprn, hbrn)〉|D22|cRA(han).AD41
]
ΣR
that B α−→ B′ where
B′ ≡ A9n+1
[
D
2
2|AD41
]
ΣR.
We have
A9n+1
[
D22|AD41
]
ΣL R B′,
and derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
(40) We have
A ≡ A9n+1
[
D22|AD41
]
ΣL and B ≡ A9n+1
[
D
2
2|AD41
]
ΣR
for some N3, . . . , Nn such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid ballots for
k = 3 . . . n, and such that⋃
3≤j≤n
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1n) and
⋃
3≤j≤n
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1n) = ∅.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A9n+1
[
D22|if φa(ba1, ha1, idp1, . . . , ban, han, idpn, h, hd) then P else 0
]
ΣL
with P = AD42. Since Miθi−1σ
i−1
N˜
ΣL , which is equal to xiΣL in the A1i
context, is a idi-valid ballot for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, using 28, it is obvious that
the φa is passed. (The auditor is just creating what the receipt generator
did, since these two ones are not cheating, it must be correct.) Then
A′ ≡ A9n+1
[
D22|AD42
]
ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A9n+1
[
D
2
2|if φa(ba1, ha1, idp1, . . . , ban, han, idpn, h, hd) then P else 0
]
ΣR
and the fact that Miθi−1σi−1N˜ ΣR are also idi-valid ballots that B −→ B′
where
B
′
= A9n+1
[
D
2
2|AD42
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ ≡ A9n+1
[
D22|AD42
]
ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
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(41) We have
A ≡ A9n+1
[
D22|AD42
]
ΣL and B ≡ A9n+1
[
D
2
2|AD42
]
ΣR
for some N3, . . . , Nn such that Nkθk−1σk−1N˜ ΣL are idk-valid ballots for
k = 3 . . . n, and such that⋃
3≤j≤n
fv(Nj) ⊆ dom(A1n) and
⋃
3≤j≤n
fn(Nj) ∩ bn(A1n) = ∅.
If A −→ A′, then it must be the case that
A ≡ A9n+1
[
cDA(h).D
3
1,n|cDA〈Ok〉
]
ΣL
and
A′ ≡ A′ [D31,n]ΣL.
It follows from
B ≡ A9n+1
[
cDA(h).D
3
1,n|cDA〈Ok〉.AD31,n
]
ΣR
that B −→ B′ where
B
′
= A′
[
D
3
1,n
]
ΣR.
Since
A′ ≡ A′ [D31,n]ΣL R B′,
we derive A′ R B′ by the closure of R under structural equivalence.
C.4 Proving the Theorem 3
As R is verifying the three properties of Definition 2, we have to show that
for all extended processes A and B, where ARB, that A ≈s B. Using Lemma
9, it is sufficient to prove that A′′n [0] ΣL ≈s A
′′
n [0] ΣR for any Ni such that
Niθi−1σi−1N˜ Σ are idi-valid ballots. As A
′′
n [0] ΣL is mapped in n˜.(θ|R)σN˜ΣL and
A
′′
n [0] ΣR is mapped in n˜.(θ|R)σN˜ΣR, we conclude using Proposition 8.

RR n° 7781
RESEARCH CENTRE
NANCY – GRAND EST
615 rue du Jardin Botanique
CS20101
54603 Villers-lès-Nancy Cedex
Publisher
Inria
Domaine de Voluceau - Rocquencourt
BP 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex
inria.fr
ISSN 0249-6399
